by jimwalton » Fri Jun 27, 2014 9:07 am
Thank you VERY MUCH for you examples of evidences. I'm quite confident you didn't write those before, so I appreciate seeing them now. I wasn't being dishonest; I can't find those statements anywhere in your previous writings.
While I easily accept that scientific study has revealed emotional functionality in animals, and those emotional responses possibly form the basis of what we call moral thought in humans, what has yet to be substantiated is that there is verifiable moral properties in the thinking of any life form other than humans. Emotional foundations are still a far cry from moral determinations.
I'm also aware that there is a strong movement today to create a bridge from evolutionary theory to morality as a social construct, and while such links are possible, to me they fail. In a system governed (I shouldn't even use the word governed because it connotes design and purpose) by naturalistic mechanisms operating on random genetic mutation, driven by laws (where did THEY come from so refined and perfectly tuned?) of physics, chemistry, and biology, it (to me) is illogical (as I explained) to chart a progression from random to purposeful when "random" is the only player in the system. And while we look backward to say, "Hey, maybe these things just happened to come about because they help us survive," to me that regressive logic. If we start at "Z", of course we can contrive a way we got from "A" to where we are now. But if we start at "A", and there is nothing else, "Z" isn't even a concept let alone a possibility.
> Evolutionary ethics can easily explain why it seems like everyone is tuned in to some objective standard without making the assumption that it actually exists.
I agree, but to me it's more logically consistent to contemplate that if everyone *seems* tuned into some objective standard, then it stands to reason that there is some objective standard.
> People with psychological and neurological issues don't seem to tune in to that same moral standard - which leads me to believe that the apparent moral standard is the product of the brain and human psychology.
Yeah, I would say that if you force a car to turn left when the destination is to the right, it's no surprise that the destination is never reached. People with mental incapacities are able to cut off proper flows and directions. And since morality is a choice to follow conscience, and not predetermined like the law of gravity, the path to conscience can be contravened. And it doesn't even take a mental patient to impair the path to the conscience.
> As to all your fine tuning examples; they can be refuted by saying either,
I know they can be refuted. All arguments can be refuted. To me they make sense and are stronger than the arguments against. It's true that we find ourselves where we do, and so we can easily say, "Well, it just must-a worked out that way because here we are!" And while that point is correct, how is it relevant? If we're playing poker, and I produce a royal flush, we'd all laugh and scream, and I'd take the pile. But if I did it again (even though there is just as much mathematical probability as the first time), you'd look at me real funny. And if I did it a 3rd time, I better be ready to run. Why? Because random probability would be far less an acceptable explanation than that somebody was messing with odds with interference.
Your next argument rings the same way to me: "Well, it could have just as easily ended up differently." But it didn't. It ended up this way, and to cruise through the "what ifs" is idle speculation. The evidence shows incredible fine-tuning. It's not at all improbable that an intelligent, personal being has created by fine-tuned, intelligent, purposeful, and personal picture that we see. On the other hand, on the atheistic hypothesis according to which these constants have their values by chance (that is, those values are not the result of anyone’s choice or intention) it is exceedingly improbable that they would be fine-tuned for life. This seems to offer support for theism: given theism, fine-tuning is not at all improbable; given atheism, it is; therefore theism is to be preferred to atheism. That's all I'm saying. It's not a non sequitur at all.
> Most professional, and academic philosophers are both Ethical Naturalists, and atheists. This means that they believe in an objective moral standard, but don't believe in God.
I know this is the case, but it doesn't prove anything. Most academics believed in a flat earth 600 years ago. We live in a very godless age, but that doesn't mean it's evidence that God doesn't exist. It's only evidence that most academics don't believe in God.
> How do you deal with the Euthyphro Dilemma?
It's a false dilemma, positing the only choices as (1) divine command theory or (2) good is independent of God, and God is not the basis of ethics. But there is at least one other alternative: God's commands are good not merely because God commanded them, but because they reflect his perfectly good nature. The Bible never affirms that there is an independent reality of good outside of God’s character, nor that commands are good merely because they come from the mouth of God. Rather than the commands of God being arbitrary, or that they exist outside of his being, and he must discover them and conform to them, those commands flow necessarily from his perfect nature. It is God's nature that is the standard by which actions are judged as good, and God's nature that is the basis of morality (we could call this Divine Nature Theory; it would be more concordant to Biblical teaching).
Thank you VERY MUCH for you examples of evidences. I'm quite confident you didn't write those before, so I appreciate seeing them now. I wasn't being dishonest; I can't find those statements anywhere in your previous writings.
While I easily accept that scientific study has revealed emotional functionality in animals, and those emotional responses possibly form the basis of what we call moral thought in humans, what has yet to be substantiated is that there is verifiable moral properties in the thinking of any life form other than humans. Emotional foundations are still a far cry from moral determinations.
I'm also aware that there is a strong movement today to create a bridge from evolutionary theory to morality as a social construct, and while such links are possible, to me they fail. In a system governed (I shouldn't even use the word governed because it connotes design and purpose) by naturalistic mechanisms operating on random genetic mutation, driven by laws (where did THEY come from so refined and perfectly tuned?) of physics, chemistry, and biology, it (to me) is illogical (as I explained) to chart a progression from random to purposeful when "random" is the only player in the system. And while we look backward to say, "Hey, maybe these things just happened to come about because they help us survive," to me that regressive logic. If we start at "Z", of course we can contrive a way we got from "A" to where we are now. But if we start at "A", and there is nothing else, "Z" isn't even a concept let alone a possibility.
> Evolutionary ethics can easily explain why it seems like everyone is tuned in to some objective standard without making the assumption that it actually exists.
I agree, but to me it's more logically consistent to contemplate that if everyone *seems* tuned into some objective standard, then it stands to reason that there is some objective standard.
> People with psychological and neurological issues don't seem to tune in to that same moral standard - which leads me to believe that the apparent moral standard is the product of the brain and human psychology.
Yeah, I would say that if you force a car to turn left when the destination is to the right, it's no surprise that the destination is never reached. People with mental incapacities are able to cut off proper flows and directions. And since morality is a choice to follow conscience, and not predetermined like the law of gravity, the path to conscience can be contravened. And it doesn't even take a mental patient to impair the path to the conscience.
> As to all your fine tuning examples; they can be refuted by saying either,
I know they can be refuted. All arguments can be refuted. To me they make sense and are stronger than the arguments against. It's true that we find ourselves where we do, and so we can easily say, "Well, it just must-a worked out that way because here we are!" And while that point is correct, how is it relevant? If we're playing poker, and I produce a royal flush, we'd all laugh and scream, and I'd take the pile. But if I did it again (even though there is just as much mathematical probability as the first time), you'd look at me real funny. And if I did it a 3rd time, I better be ready to run. Why? Because random probability would be far less an acceptable explanation than that somebody was messing with odds with interference.
Your next argument rings the same way to me: "Well, it could have just as easily ended up differently." But it didn't. It ended up this way, and to cruise through the "what ifs" is idle speculation. The evidence shows incredible fine-tuning. It's not at all improbable that an intelligent, personal being has created by fine-tuned, intelligent, purposeful, and personal picture that we see. On the other hand, on the atheistic hypothesis according to which these constants have their values by chance (that is, those values are not the result of anyone’s choice or intention) it is exceedingly improbable that they would be fine-tuned for life. This seems to offer support for theism: given theism, fine-tuning is not at all improbable; given atheism, it is; therefore theism is to be preferred to atheism. That's all I'm saying. It's not a non sequitur at all.
> Most professional, and academic philosophers are both Ethical Naturalists, and atheists. This means that they believe in an objective moral standard, but don't believe in God.
I know this is the case, but it doesn't prove anything. Most academics believed in a flat earth 600 years ago. We live in a very godless age, but that doesn't mean it's evidence that God doesn't exist. It's only evidence that most academics don't believe in God.
> How do you deal with the Euthyphro Dilemma?
It's a false dilemma, positing the only choices as (1) divine command theory or (2) good is independent of God, and God is not the basis of ethics. But there is at least one other alternative: God's commands are good not merely because God commanded them, but because they reflect his perfectly good nature. The Bible never affirms that there is an independent reality of good outside of God’s character, nor that commands are good merely because they come from the mouth of God. Rather than the commands of God being arbitrary, or that they exist outside of his being, and he must discover them and conform to them, those commands flow necessarily from his perfect nature. It is God's nature that is the standard by which actions are judged as good, and God's nature that is the basis of morality (we could call this Divine Nature Theory; it would be more concordant to Biblical teaching).