by jimwalton » Wed Mar 14, 2018 9:29 pm
> Omniscience is defined as the state of knowing everything.
The first problem with your case is the foundation of it, which may topple your whole case. This is not the definition of omniscience. When we say that God is omniscient, we are undeniably talking about all things that are proper objects of knowledge. For instance, God doesn't know what it's like to learn, he doesn't know what it's like not to know everything, he doesn't know what would happen if an unstoppable force met an immoveable wall. These are absurdities. By omniscience we mean that God knows himself and all other things, whether they are past, present, or future, and he knows them exhaustively and to both extents of eternity. Such knowledge cannot come about through reasoning, process, empiricism, induction or deduction, and it certainly doesn't embrace the absurd, the impossible, or the self-contradictory.
To complicate the problem of defining omniscience, it can't be established what knowledge really is and how it all works. What are the principle grounds of knowledge, and particularly of God's knowledge? Does he evaluate propositions? Does he perceive? What about intuitions, reasoning, logic, and creativity? We consider knowledge to be the result of neurobiological events, but what is it for God?
But let's continue on to the true issue at hand: Is an omniscient being capable of thought? Of course he is, because thoughts are more than just knowledge, and they are more than just evaluating propositions, and the Bible defines God's mind as...
- creating new information (Isa. 40-48)
- showing comprehension
- gaining new information (Gn. 22.12, but it's not new knowledge)
- He orders the cosmos (Gn. 1)
- He designs (viz., the plan for the temple)
- He deliberates (Hos. 11.8)
- He can reason with people (the whole book of Malachi; Gn. 18.17-33)
- He can change a course of action (Ex. 32; 1 Sam. 8-12)
- He remembers (all over the place)
Is God's omniscience propositional or non-propositional? Can God have beliefs (since beliefs can be true, and beliefs are different than knowledge)? Are God's beliefs occurrent or dispositional? As you can see, this can all get pretty deep pretty quickly. At root, a cognitive faculty is simply a particular ability to know something, and since God knows everything, his cognitive faculties are both complete and operational. Perhaps we can define God's omniscience as:
- Having knowledge of all true propositions and having no false beliefs
- Having knowledge that is not surpassed or surpassable
In other words, your definition of omniscience is an inadequate foundation for your contention. But let's move on.
You go on to assume that God's omniscience is deterministic, making free will impossible, yet I would contend that knowledge is never causative. It doesn't matter how much I know, it doesn't mean that knowledge has caused anything. Only power is causative, so even supreme knowledge is not causative. In other words, God's knowledge (being able to see ahead of time) what you will choose doesn't mean that he used any power to create or manipulate that choice in you.
I think the real problem is that we perceive time as linear but time may not be linear, i.e., "the future already exists." But you construe knowledge of the future as determining the future, but this is not necessarily the case. Suppose I know that the sun will rise tomorrow—not just assume it, but suppose (for the sake of argument) that I know it. That doesn't mean I caused it. Knowledge is not causative. There are truly alternate possible futures, but an omniscient timeless being can see all simultaneously—and that capability doesn't require that he made those decisions himself, robbing free agents of their alternatives. Free will and omniscience are not mutually exclusive if the divine being is omniscient and timeless, and if time is not solely linear.
Free will cannot be an illusion because it is necessary for human life. First of all, the ability to reason is grounded in free will. Reasoning involves deciding if something is true or credible by equating it to the reality to which it refers, then comparing it with competing ideas, and choosing which idea best fits reality. Without free will and the legitimate ability to choose, the role of reason itself in any intellectual discipline is suspect—there is no mechanism for evaluating information and deciding on plausibility. Without free will, then, science itself is an illusion, all conversations are meaningless, and our thoughts are unreliable. Our lives are irredeemably incoherent.
We study our natural world (the sciences) as if self-awareness, self-direction, and reason are real. We can evaluate that there are realities outside of ourselves that we can observe and draw true conclusions about. The notion of truth takes us beyond mere biological determinism, which is only concerned with survival (food, flight, fight, and reproduction). We act as if we honestly believe that we can ask "what if..." questions, assess the possibilities, make authentic decisions, and conclude truth. All of these are evidences of free will, reason, and objective truth, all of which show that we live and function as if these things are real, reliable, and even have a facet to them that could be considered "true."
Secondarily, if free will didn't exist, we couldn’t know it, because I can't evaluate possibilities or draw conclusions. I couldn't think my way out of a paper bag let alone ascertain free will. Without free will, we couldn't know anything. Knowledge is justified true belief. We decide if a belief is true by comparing it to the reality to which it refers, comparing it with competing ideas, and choosing which idea best fits reality. This requires some level of free will. If you don't believe in free will, then you don't believe in the validity of reasoning, and all arguments to the contrary are self-defeating.
Third, without free will, the characteristics that most make us human are impossible: love, forgiveness, grace, mercy, and kindness, to name a few. If I have no choice but to love you, it's not love at all. Love requires the will to choose. If the only reason I forgive you is because I have no other alternative, then I have not forgiven you at all, but only followed an irresistible force. Without free will, I am a determined animal, perhaps even robotic, but I am not human.
Fourth, without free will there is no such thing as justice. I can neither find nor enforce justice in a court of law if there is no self-direction, either on the criminal's part (he can't be held accountable if he was determined to do it) or on the judge’s part (he can't make a rational decision if there is no such thing).
One cannot have free will without self-direction, and one cannot have self-direction without self-awareness, and one cannot have self-awareness without consciousness. The evidences are convincing that we have all these things. I have consciousness, therefore I am self-aware, and therefore I am self-directed. Both reason and experience tell us these things are so. Everything about humanity and reason point to the necessity of free will.
> Omniscience is defined as the state of knowing everything.
The first problem with your case is the foundation of it, which may topple your whole case. This is not the definition of omniscience. When we say that God is omniscient, we are undeniably talking about all things that are proper objects of knowledge. For instance, God doesn't know what it's like to learn, he doesn't know what it's like not to know everything, he doesn't know what would happen if an unstoppable force met an immoveable wall. These are absurdities. By omniscience we mean that God knows himself and all other things, whether they are past, present, or future, and he knows them exhaustively and to both extents of eternity. Such knowledge cannot come about through reasoning, process, empiricism, induction or deduction, and it certainly doesn't embrace the absurd, the impossible, or the self-contradictory.
To complicate the problem of defining omniscience, it can't be established what knowledge really is and how it all works. What are the principle grounds of knowledge, and particularly of God's knowledge? Does he evaluate propositions? Does he perceive? What about intuitions, reasoning, logic, and creativity? We consider knowledge to be the result of neurobiological events, but what is it for God?
But let's continue on to the true issue at hand: Is an omniscient being capable of thought? Of course he is, because thoughts are more than just knowledge, and they are more than just evaluating propositions, and the Bible defines God's mind as...
- creating new information (Isa. 40-48)
- showing comprehension
- gaining new information (Gn. 22.12, but it's not new knowledge)
- He orders the cosmos (Gn. 1)
- He designs (viz., the plan for the temple)
- He deliberates (Hos. 11.8)
- He can reason with people (the whole book of Malachi; Gn. 18.17-33)
- He can change a course of action (Ex. 32; 1 Sam. 8-12)
- He remembers (all over the place)
Is God's omniscience propositional or non-propositional? Can God have beliefs (since beliefs can be true, and beliefs are different than knowledge)? Are God's beliefs occurrent or dispositional? As you can see, this can all get pretty deep pretty quickly. At root, a cognitive faculty is simply a particular ability to know something, and since God knows everything, his cognitive faculties are both complete and operational. Perhaps we can define God's omniscience as:
- Having knowledge of all true propositions and having no false beliefs
- Having knowledge that is not surpassed or surpassable
In other words, your definition of omniscience is an inadequate foundation for your contention. But let's move on.
You go on to assume that God's omniscience is deterministic, making free will impossible, yet I would contend that knowledge is never causative. It doesn't matter how much I know, it doesn't mean that knowledge has caused anything. Only power is causative, so even supreme knowledge is not causative. In other words, God's knowledge (being able to see ahead of time) what you will choose doesn't mean that he used any power to create or manipulate that choice in you.
I think the real problem is that we perceive time as linear but time may not be linear, i.e., "the future already exists." But you construe knowledge of the future as determining the future, but this is not necessarily the case. Suppose I know that the sun will rise tomorrow—not just assume it, but suppose (for the sake of argument) that I know it. That doesn't mean I caused it. Knowledge is not causative. There are truly alternate possible futures, but an omniscient timeless being can see all simultaneously—and that capability doesn't require that he made those decisions himself, robbing free agents of their alternatives. Free will and omniscience are not mutually exclusive if the divine being is omniscient and timeless, and if time is not solely linear.
Free will cannot be an illusion because it is necessary for human life. First of all, the ability to reason is grounded in free will. Reasoning involves deciding if something is true or credible by equating it to the reality to which it refers, then comparing it with competing ideas, and choosing which idea best fits reality. Without free will and the legitimate ability to choose, the role of reason itself in any intellectual discipline is suspect—there is no mechanism for evaluating information and deciding on plausibility. Without free will, then, science itself is an illusion, all conversations are meaningless, and our thoughts are unreliable. Our lives are irredeemably incoherent.
We study our natural world (the sciences) as if self-awareness, self-direction, and reason are real. We can evaluate that there are realities outside of ourselves that we can observe and draw true conclusions about. The notion of truth takes us beyond mere biological determinism, which is only concerned with survival (food, flight, fight, and reproduction). We act as if we honestly believe that we can ask "what if..." questions, assess the possibilities, make authentic decisions, and conclude truth. All of these are evidences of free will, reason, and objective truth, all of which show that we live and function as if these things are real, reliable, and even have a facet to them that could be considered "true."
Secondarily, if free will didn't exist, we couldn’t know it, because I can't evaluate possibilities or draw conclusions. I couldn't think my way out of a paper bag let alone ascertain free will. Without free will, we couldn't know anything. Knowledge is justified true belief. We decide if a belief is true by comparing it to the reality to which it refers, comparing it with competing ideas, and choosing which idea best fits reality. This requires some level of free will. If you don't believe in free will, then you don't believe in the validity of reasoning, and all arguments to the contrary are self-defeating.
Third, without free will, the characteristics that most make us human are impossible: love, forgiveness, grace, mercy, and kindness, to name a few. If I have no choice but to love you, it's not love at all. Love requires the will to choose. If the only reason I forgive you is because I have no other alternative, then I have not forgiven you at all, but only followed an irresistible force. Without free will, I am a determined animal, perhaps even robotic, but I am not human.
Fourth, without free will there is no such thing as justice. I can neither find nor enforce justice in a court of law if there is no self-direction, either on the criminal's part (he can't be held accountable if he was determined to do it) or on the judge’s part (he can't make a rational decision if there is no such thing).
One cannot have free will without self-direction, and one cannot have self-direction without self-awareness, and one cannot have self-awareness without consciousness. The evidences are convincing that we have all these things. I have consciousness, therefore I am self-aware, and therefore I am self-directed. Both reason and experience tell us these things are so. Everything about humanity and reason point to the necessity of free will.