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[jimwalton]

The discussion is interesting, but we are no longer progressing. I obviously believe that the evidence is far stronger for a metaphysical, spiritual causal mechanism for life as we know it, and you obviously believe the natural explanations are sufficient causes for what we see. It's apparent that no further conversation will either persuade or dissuade either one of us.

Let's talk about the ontological argument for the existence of God. We have already touched on it, but the fuller argument goes as such:

1. If God (a supreme, supernatural divine being) does not exist, his existence is logically impossible. That doesn't mean he can't be made up in someone's imagination (which is still possible even if he doesn't exist); what it means is that if God doesn't really exist, the very concept of God is inconsistent or self-contradictory. His existence doesn't even make sense.

2. But if God does exist, then it's necessary that He does. It cannot be otherwise if He is truly God and if He truly exists.

3. Therefore (first conclusion), God's existence is either impossible (inconsistent and self-contradictory) or necessary. There's no halfway position.

4. If God's existence is logically impossible, then even the concept of God and everything we think about him is contradictory. We are trying to make a reality what is not only nonsensical, but impossible.

5. But the concept of God is not contradictory. There's actually good sense to it in many ways, for example, that something caused what we see. While some may not agree, it's assuredly not contradictory.

6. Therefore (second conclusion), if God's existence isn't contradictory (if that choice is removed from the equation), then the only reasonable choice left is that God is logically necessary.

God is either impossible or necessary. Since He's not impossible, then He must be necessary, and therefore He exists.

[Choking]

Why do you claim that premise 1 is true? I can think of many things that do not exist, and yet are not self-contradictory. In fact, there are many versions of God that are self-contradictory, and there are many versions of God that are not self-contradictory. Do all of the non-self-contradictory versions need to exist? By this logic it would seem so, but I doubt you believe in multiple Gods.

[jimwalton]

The argument pertains particularly to God, not to other possible things that could exist yet are not self-contradictory (such as a blue-and-orange striped bird with a pink polka-dotted beak).

Here the reference point is God, a supreme, supernatural divine being—a being greater than which cannot be conceived. If such a being does not exist, then He cannot come into existence (commence to exist). If he did at some time begin to exist either by causation or spontaneous generation, he would by definition be a limited being because he is neither eternal, self-sufficient, nor noncontingent. Therefore since he cannot come into existence (commence to exist), and since he cannot cease to exist, if he does not eternally exist his existence is impossible. And therefore if he does exist, His existence is necessary because he is truly God.

If God commenced to exist at some point, or can cease to exist at some point, his eternal nature is in contradiction to his generation or cessation, or is in some way logically absurd. But if God does exist, it follows that He necessarily exists. If God cannot come into or go out of existence, it is necessarily true that if He ever existed, He always existed.

[Choking]

Not being able to come into existence is not the same as self-contradictory.

Your argument was that if God does not exist, then the very concept is self-contradictory. I would say that, in our universe, (1) God does not exist, (2) God cannot spontaneously come into existence, and (3) the concept of God is not self-contradictory (depending on the definition). It seems we agree on 2 and 3, but your point seems to be that 1 and 3 are incompatible. Why is that? Can this argument apply to anything that is defined as eternal?

Particularly important, I think, is that if God being self-contradictory is dependent on his existence, then we can't know whether or not he is self-contradictory, because we don't know whether he exists. Basically, that makes premise 5 unprovable.

[jimwalton]

> Not being able to come into existence is not the same as self-contradictory.

In God's case it is because the ideal supreme being is eternal and not contingent. If He came into being due to some other causal mechanism, then he is dependent on that cause for his being, and therefore he is neither noncontingent nor self-sufficient, and therefore self-contradictory.

> Your argument was that if God does not exist, then the very concept is self-contradictory.

My primary point was that if God doesn't exist, his existence is logically impossible. What I meant when I said "If God doesn't exist, the very concept of God is self-contradictory" is that if God truly does not exist, to conceive of an ideal eternally-existing being that doesn't exist is a self-contradiction.

Regarding your statements, #1 begs for evidence or proof before it can be accepted as true. As stated, it's a presupposition without substantiation.

> if God being self-contradictory is dependent on his existence

I think this is precisely the case. If God doesn't exist, even the concept of God is pure nonsense. If he does, (1) he cannot be self-contradictory, and then he is logically necessary. So God is either impossible or necessary. Since he's not impossible, he is necessary.

[Choking]

Okay, but then how can you prove that God is not self-contradictory? If it's dependent on his existence, then in order to prove that he's not self-contradictory you have to first prove that he exists. It's a circular argument.

Basically, you say that, if he doesn't exist, then he's impossible. So, unless we begin by assuming his existence, you admit he could be impossible. Therefore, you have no way to defend premise 5 without already assuming he exists.

Also, which qualities of God make this argument apply? So far it just seems to be the idea that he's eternal. So does it apply to anything that's defined as eternal? Why could I not define a blue-and-orange striped bird with a pink polka-dotted beak that is also eternal? It seems this argument would also prove that this zany bird exists.

[jimwalton]

> but then how can you prove that God is not self-contradictory?

It's a basic principle of logic: A cannot equal non-A. If you want to claim God could exist in a self-contradictory state you are claiming God can not only do what is logically impossible but so that he can even be logically impossible and yet exist in that state. It's absurd. It's a matter of reality that things cannot be self-contradictory. If you can make sense out of God being self-contradictory, then the burden rests on you to show the possibility.

> So, unless we begin by assuming his existence, you admit he could be impossible. Therefore, you have no way to defend premise 5 without already assuming he exists.

I didn't begin by assuming his existence but only the logical possibility of his existence. Premise 5 follows 1-4 and is merely claiming what is obvious: the concept of God is not contradictory. There are many ways that the concept of God can make sense and be a reasonable choice.

> So does it apply to anything that's defined as eternal?

Well, this is the issue. Nothing else is defined as eternal. Current science, math, and logic tell us that the universe and everything in it had a beginning, and so cannot be defined as eternal.

[Choking]

> If you want to claim God could exist in a self-contradictory state you are claiming God can not only do what is logically impossible but so that he can even be logically impossible and yet exist in that state. It's absurd. It's a matter of reality that things cannot be self-contradictory.

I am not saying that God can exist in a self-contradictory state. I am saying that God might be impossible, because he might not exist. We can't say either way without first assuming his existence.

We are assuming that whether or not God is self-contradictory is entirely dependent on whether he exists. If this is true, then we can only make the positive claim that "God is not self-contradictory" if we assume his existence.

> If you can make sense out of God being self-contradictory, then the burden rests on you to show the possibility.

You argument entirely depends on the premise that God is not self-contradictory. You have to show that that is true, if you want your argument to be taken seriously.

Your argument reads as follows:

1. God is self-contradictory IFF (if and only if) God does not exist.
2. God is not self-contradictory IFF God does exist.
3. God is necessary IFF God does exist.
4. God is not self-contradictory.
5. Therefore, God exists.

The burden of proof lies on you for premise 4. So far, the only evidence you have given is that God is not self-contradictory if he exists. But what if he doesn't exist? Remember that we can't begin by assuming that he does.

> Well, this is the issue. Nothing else is defined as eternal. Current science, math, and logic tell us that the universe and everything in it had a beginning, and so cannot be defined as eternal.

Alright, let's take the bird. I'll call it the Zanybird. I define the Zanybird as a blue-and-orange striped bird with a pink polka-dotted beak that is also eternal. By this argument, the Zanybird is proven to exist. Doesn't it seem like there's a flaw in the argument?

[jimwalton]

> I am saying that God might be impossible, because he might not exist. We can't say either way without first assuming his existence.

You seem to be misunderstanding the argument. The argument doesn't assume God exists (as you said, "If it's dependent on his existence, then in order to prove that he's not self-contradictory you have to first prove that he exists. It's a circular argument.") The 1st premise is conditional: *If* he doesn't exist, his existence is logically impossible. The 2nd premise is also conditional: If he *does* exist his existence is necessary. There is nothing in either premise assuming his existence. We're just dealing with logical possibilities and logical impossibilities.

> We are assuming that whether or not God is self-contradictory is entirely dependent on whether he exists.

This is incorrect. I'm saying **if** he doesn't exist, then he doesn't exist and it's impossible that he exists. But **if he does** exist, then we have to define him as God and not something less or something self-contradictory. These are just logical potentialities, neither assuming his existence nor creating a case dependent on his existence. I am saying that *if* he exists, he cannot be self-contradictory. Logically speaking, if God is a possibility, then he must be logically possible (and not a self-contradiction or an absurdity).

> Your argument entirely depends on the premise that God is not self-contradictory. You have to show that that is true.

I did. A ≠ not A. It's a fundamental principle of logic.

> Your argument reads as follows:

No, that's not my argument. You have changed it.

> Zanybird

The flaw in your analogy betrays the argument. God, the subject of the argument, is defined as the ideal supreme supernatural being—the uncaused First Cause who has being in and of Himself. Your eternal Zanybird isn't this Being, and therefore the analogy is unsuitable for the subject at hand. The flaw is not in the argument but in (1) your reframing of the argument to change it, and (2) your unsuitable analogy that also changes the argument.

The argument is about God, not presupposing or assuming his existence, but talking about the logical impossibility or necessity of such a being existing.

[Choking]

A large issue, then, seems to be premise 4 in your original argument. I think I've been misunderstanding, but you seem to be saying that [God is impossible] proves that [God is self-contradictory]. Is that right?

This clearly needs to be laid out in a logical format. Is my version of your argument wrong in any other way? As far as I can see, I only simplified it and removed the explanations. Can you frame it in a similar logical manner?

When you do reframe it, please include the premises that lead to the conclusions that God is not self-contradictory or impossible, and that God is impossible if he doesn't exist.

After that, I think we can get into why the zanybird does or does not apply. It still seems to me that your argument can apply to anything that's defined as eternal. You say that "God, the subject of the argument, is defined as the ideal supreme supernatural being—the uncaused First Cause who has being in and of Himself."

But none of that seems important for the argument to still follow logically. All that seems important, as far as I can understand it, is the property of being eternal.