>> I'm arguing it cannot change its will.
> It seems to me that if it can change its will, then it is free.

Yes. I'm arguing that it cannot.

> These new thoughts arise by intention.

Some do. Others don't. Some thoughts are just random fluctuations. The thoughts that arise through intention are subject to will but not free will. The intention is not freely willed.

> I can sit here and make myself generate new thoughts about something—any "something" of my choosing.

There are certain things that you can't generate thoughts of, namely things that don't occur to you. This limitation in options narrows down the point of focus if there are certain options that don't occur to you. Again, the part of you that makes yourself generate new thoughts is itself a thought, a particular of will but not free will.

> I can mull alternatives and freely pick one, or I can jump start a new thought out of nothing.

I think that jump starting a new thought out of nothing would constitute randomness. There wouldn't really be will involved, otherwise it would not be entirely ex nihilo.

> I'm arguing it cannot change its will.

It seems to me that if it can change its will, then it is free.

> A difficulty with this is discerning where thoughts begin and end, and whether thoughts can arise in a vacuum. Moreover, how are new thoughts as you describe them freely willed? If they are unforseen, aren't they just random fluctuations?

Yes, this is a difficulty, knowing where thoughts begin and end. It's obviously where you and I see things differently.

These new thoughts arise by intention. I can sit here and make myself generate new thoughts about something—any "something" of my choosing. I can mull alternatives and freely pick one, or I can jump start a new thought out of nothing.

> So the dog is not freely deciding which direction to veer to avoid me?

We're talking about will here, not outcomes. If a dog was forced to veer in a direction against its will, (drugged, or something similar, hypothetically) it would be coerced. If it veered according to its desire, it would be un-coerced. Neither changes the result. The dog in your example decides to veer in a direction because of its will. I'm arguing it cannot change its will. The only thing that could make its will different would be a countering will that cancelled out the will to get the shoe (the countering will might be formed from training, experience, etc) and thus means that the dog's inclination would be different.

> Sometimes my thoughts are new, not arising from a previous thought. That's my experience

A difficulty with this is discerning where thoughts begin and end, and whether thoughts can arise in a vacuum. Moreover, how are new thoughts as you describe them freely willed? If they are unforseen, aren't they just random fluctuations?

> What directs your thoughts if not another thought that you should do so?

Sometimes my thoughts are new, not arising from a previous thought. That's my experience.

> Hell is not a pre-existing reality.

Correct.

> It's a place God has created and threatened people with.

God created it, yes, but not for people (Mt. 25.41). I wouldn't say God threatens people with hell. He's just forthright about its reality and the that people will go there if they don't repent.

If I were to inform you that a tornado was headed your way and unless you took certain actions you would surely be killed, that's not a threat. It's rather a warning about real consequences based on real behavior. I would say a threat is a power play, a warning is an expression of truth or compassion or both.

> That's coercion, and a worse form than mafia I will add.

I don't perceive it as coercion because he's just telling the truth about the reality of what lies ahead. If I stop your car on the highway and tell you the bridge is out and you need to turn around, that's not mafia-coercion, it's responsible information.

> That's an example of will, not free will. Have you ever told said dog that it could choose to not want the shoe?

So the dog is not freely deciding which direction to veer to avoid me?

> something can be a first cause without having free will.

Yeah, we don't agree on this.

> How do you know this? What evidence do you have?

My experience. Think about your own experience as well. What directs your thoughts if not another thought that you should do so?

> Threats of and warnings about reality are meant to be compelling, not coercive.

That's not what I'm talking about. Hell is not a pre-existing reality. It's a place God has created and threatened people with. That's coercion, and a worse form than mafia I will add.

> That's one angle, yes. There are many other aspects to reason, however, that contribute to free will.

I'm listening. Could you give an example?

> I would readily admit that animals have free will. Have you every tried to get your shoe away from a dog?

That's an example of will, not free will. Have you ever told said dog that it could choose to not want the shoe?

> An uncoerced decision arises from an independent source that, while considering environment and cause-and-effect, is a first cause of the action at hand.

Like I was saying earlier, something can be a first cause without having free will.

> Animals have that. I haven't heard Christians describe the animal kingdom as having free will.

I would readily admit that animals have free will. Have you every tried to get your shoe away from a dog?

> Computers can distinguish courses in making calculations. It doesn't mean they have free will

Correct.

> Reason for me inhibits my ability to do things I consider completely unreasonable, such as causing unnecessary harm or breaking something valuable. As such reason actually detracts from free will in this way.

That's one angle, yes. There are many other aspects to reason, however, that contribute to free will.

> Autonomy is often defined as freedom, independence, and uncoerced decisions. I think all these things can exist without free will.

An uncoerced decision arises from an independent source that, while considering environment and cause-and-effect, is a first cause of the action at hand.

> I would in fact argue that a God might be more coercive in threatening people with hellfire.

Threats of and warnings about reality are meant to be compelling, not coercive. To make wise decisions, one needs as much information as possible, and it's helpful to have the negative as well as positive consequences in hand.

> There is also a difference between coercing people, as a Mafia syndicate might do, and being compelled, which can simply be a case of one thing leading to another, with no infringement upon being.

Correct. That's why God does not coerce, though we know of one case (Jonah) where his guidance was very heavy-handed.

> The only way I can direct any of my thoughts is through the existence of another thought

How do you know this? What evidence do you have?

> It's the modulation of ongoing action

Animals have that. I haven't heard Christians describe the animal kingdom as having free will.

> the distinguishing of potential courses,

Computers can distinguish courses in making calculations. It doesn't mean they have free will.

> the ability to reason

Reason for me inhibits my ability to do things I consider completely unreasonable, such as causing unnecessary harm or breaking something valuable. As such reason actually detracts from free will in this way.

> the exercise of autonomy

Autonomy is often defined as freedom, independence, and uncoerced decisions. I think all these things can exist without free will. I would in fact argue that a God might be more coercive in threatening people with hellfire. There is also a difference between coercing people, as a Mafia syndicate might do, and being compelled, which can simply be a case of one thing leading to another, with no infringement upon being.

> and the consequent self-direction of thought and behavior.

The only way I can direct any of my thoughts is through the existence of another thought. Without that thought influencing the mix, things would be different. The thought cannot freely will itself however. It simply is.

> Consciousness is just another characteristic.

I disagree. Trees have limbs, and I have limbs—those are characteristics. But a tree doesn't have consciousness. That's an attribute of my nature. I would still be human without limbs; I would not still be human without consciousness.

> I can't choose to not be conscious, and I can't choose what I'm conscious of.

Correct, because consciousness is a necessary attribute. Nor can you choose whether or not to think. Nor can you choose to transport yourself to the rings of Saturn. These immutables don't mean you have no free will, or that you're somewhat the same as a tree.

> just as you think God can't do things "willy nilly", I can't either.

Correct. We can only do things that are proper objects of our power.

> How does God making them disappear not constitute a real action?

Oh, it's a real action, but that's not what I said. What I said is that He can't defy reality. Once humans are born, according to the Scriptures, we exist a souls that continue on past this life. For God to make a human disappear would be an repudiation of that reality, and therefore such an action is contrary to fact and not possible.

> If he created them without precedent, surely he can also extinguish them?

Lives can be ended so that they transition to death, but they cannot be magically extinguished *in nihilo*.

> Surely he would know the nature of what he is creating and thus be more aware than us what path we are going down?

Yes, certainly.

> He would also know what would make us respond in a particular way: for example, if I was to do something wrong but which I thought was right, I would respond by not doing the wrong action if God showed me evidence of it being bad.

I disagree. I have shown my kids evidence of things being bad, and they weren't dissuaded one bit: down the wrong path they chose to go. I can plead, show love, show evidence, reason, and even pressure. Nope. They choose what they want.

There just may be [i]nothing[/i] more He can do to motivate us to love Him. I was just listening to Bonnie Raitt yesterday: "I can't make you love me if you don't; I can't make your heart feel something it won't." With God it's not about religion, it's about love.

> Influence and direction. Another example is the Sun. It has power and influence over the nature of our world, without having free will.

We obviously have very different definitions of free will. I know free will is pretty tough to define without allowing any loopholes. I can only sort of describe its characteristics and its necessity. It's the modulation of ongoing action, the distinguishing of potential courses, the ability to reason, the exercise of autonomy, and the consequent self-direction of thought and behavior. Those have nothing to do with electricity or the Sun.

> I also reject your illustration of electricity, which has no consciousness.

Consciousness is just another characteristic. I can't choose to not be conscious, and I can't choose what I'm conscious of. I can make decisions within my consciousness, but just as you think God can't do things "willy nilly", I can't either. Which leads us to our next point.

> People have lives; they are souls; they are real. God can't just wave a silly finger and make them disappear like a magician on a stage. Their reality has to be dealt with in reality with real actions.

How does God making them disappear not constitute a real action? If he created them without precedent, surely he can also extinguish them?

> There is no evidence in the text that God is shaping the narrative to His predetermined direction. It's true that God is working to rebalance an imbalance, but the thrust of the text is precisely the part that people play in shaping the narrative—that it is not set in stone by an unresponsive God. When God says in Jer. 18.6 basically "I can do as I wish," He explains that to mean that He is free to respond to the responses of humans—that if He warns them and they change course, then He also can change course. He has a right to act as He wishes in response to human decisions.

Surely he would know the nature of what he is creating and thus be more aware than us what path we are going down? He would also know what would make us respond in a particular way: for example, if I was to do something wrong but which I thought was right, I would respond by not doing the wrong action if God showed me evidence of it being bad.

> What is "inner will and power" if not free will?

Influence and direction. Another example is the Sun. It has power and influence over the nature of our world, without having free will.

> They still don't deserve it though.

In this analogy, it's probably safe to say they didn't deserve it, though we'd have to specify what is meant by "deserve." If someone intentionally walks alone in a knowingly dangerous part of town at a knowingly dangerous time of day (viz., night), "deserve" may not pertain to a moral condition but rather to a volitional one.

>> I would say no, these are not to what Jeremiah is referring.
> Could you expand?

There is no evidence in the text that God is shaping the narrative to His predetermined direction. It's true that God is working to rebalance an imbalance, but the thrust of the text is precisely the part that people play in shaping the narrative—that it is not set in stone by an unresponsive God. When God says in Jer. 18.6 basically "I can do as I wish," He explains that to mean that He is free to respond to the responses of humans—that if He warns them and they change course, then He also can change course. He has a right to act as He wishes in response to human decisions.

> We can't, but God could make a killer who intends to kill again disappear.

No He can't. There is a thing called "reality" of which God is a part. "Omnipotence" doesn't mean that God can do anything willy-nilly, against reality and even self-contradictory (which is not the case here). People have lives; they are souls; they are real. God can't just wave a silly finger and make them disappear like a magician on a stage. Their reality has to be dealt with in reality with real actions.

> Creative power doesn't necessarily mean free will. Electricity has creative power in a sense as it creates light (if used correctly).

I disagree, and I also reject your illustration of electricity, which has no consciousness. The electricity has no volition or any cognizant "power," but displays only potential and kinetic energy. It is idle until there is a stimulus to which it gives a response. Without the stimulus, it can never "decide" in any sense of the word.

> I believe that inner will and power exist; they just don't necessarily mean "free will" exists.

What is "inner will and power" if not free will?