by jimwalton » Fri Dec 23, 2016 3:57 am
> This is a commonly-recited proposition even more commonly misapplied. The absence of expected evidence is regularly and appropriately taken as evidence of absence, in much the same way as I know there's not a tiger in my office chair right now because I'm sitting in it and I don't see a tiger.
We must make some distinctions here. If I'm walking my dog in a dog park, and I look around and see no tigers, I can logically conclude that absence of evidence is indeed evidence of absence. I have sufficient access to the situation to judge reliably. Now imagine that you strain your ears and hear only dogs and their owners, as well as the faint sound of traffic in the distance. So you observe, "It appears that no dog whistles are being blown today." Would it be reasonable for you to conclude this? Not in this case. In this case the absence of evidence does not warrant evidence of absence because you do not have sufficient access to the situation to judge reliably. Even if the dog whistles had been blowing, you would not have heard them. In other words, we are entitled to move from an "appears" claim to a claim about what is *likely* to be the case only when a certain condition is satisfied. In other words, a move from “It appears there is no x” to “Therefore there is probably no x” is entitled only if the following condition is satisfied: If there were an x, we would probably know it.
You can judge there is no tiger in your office chair because if there were, it would be evident. In contrast, if evidence of an ancient event is warranted but not yet discovered, it is not *necessarily* evident. The condition "if there were an x, we would probably know it" is not completely satisfied.
For instance, Hoffmeier (Egyptologists) points out that Aper el's name was the first of a high ranking, Semite official to be found in Egypt (it was found at Sakkara in the late 80s), even though Sakkara has been excavated and explored for more than a century. "If such a high ranking official as Vizier Aper el was completely unknown to modern scholarship until the late 1980s, despite the fact that he lived in one of the better documented periods of Egyptian history [fourteenth century], and was buried in arguably the most excavated site in Egypt, it is wrong to demand, as some have, that direct archaeological evidence for Joseph should be available if he were in fact a historical figure." This is even more the case, he says, because Joseph lived during a period when surviving Egyptian documents of any kind are sparse and because Joseph operated in the Nile Delta, an area that remains "underexcavated" to this day.
If we take that same science and apply it to the Exodus, we see distinctive proof that "The condition 'if there were an x, we would probably know it' is not completely satisfied."
> Fundamentally speaking, it actually is. Deduction is a great way of determining whether the assumed truth of a premise or set of premises necessarily entails the truth of some conclusion, but outside of those instances where some proposition can be shown to lead to a contradiction, empirical investigation is the only workable means of determining whether your premises are true.
Have you ever seen one of those "Magic Eye" pictures—a flurry of computer lines (usually geometric patterns), and when you stare at them long enough in the right way a 3-dimensional images emerges? We look at the particulars of the picture, but we also look beyond them, and even ignore them. Once the image comes clear, we can actually look right at it. This is a more accurate picture of knowledge than simple deduction. The goal is to see a coherent pattern, and we do it through clues, focus, and integration. Whether we are figuring why a faucet is dripping, or looking for clues to the biblical Exodus, recognizing a familiar face or learning to play the piano, we rely on body experiences, integrate all the input data, and come to knowledge. Even the generating of a hypothesis to begin the process of scientific inquiry is not an act of deductive reasoning. The human effort that generates true thinking and true knowledge is different from deduction, as is illustrated by the Magic Eye integration. In a limited view of knowing, the only approved method of extending knowledge is deduction. In deductive reasoning you move from statements that are called premises to a statement called a conclusion. The conclusion of a deductive argument follows necessarily from the premises: if the premises are true, then conclusion has to be true also. This is what we call an inferential connection. What actually happens in the act of knowing is that the relationship between clues and pattern, subsidiaries and focus, is not one of premises and deduced conclusion. When you see a Magic Eye picture, you cannot fully express in words all the particulars on which you rely, nor all that the focus includes, let alone a step-by-step procedure you followed to move from the one to the other. You cannot express the particulars as premises because prior to the actual act of integration—before the Magic Eye picture came clear—you are in no position to articulate the very things that you must rely on if you are to integrate to the pattern.
Deduction certainly has its places and uses, but it's far from all knowledge. Deductivism is an approach to reasoning called "falsificationism," by which we falsify the elements that do not belong in the set under study. We cannot logically prove "all swans are white," no matter how many swans we see, but we can logically *disprove* it if we see even just one black swan. That's how science and deductive reasoning work.
But there is also inductive reasoning, abductive reasoning, abstract reasoning, and integration. Deductive can't begin to tell you if i felt chilly yesterday, if I think Jimmy Fallon is funny, or if I saw a sunset 3 evenings ago that I consider to be beautiful. Fundamentally speaking, empiricism isn't even close to being the only path to knowledge, and may not even be the best path.
> You appear to have conceded that these women are being married to and penetrated by their captors without their consent ever being sought or obtained.
You are making some assumptions that may be unwarranted:
1. The soldier was unfeeling towards the situation and demeanor of the woman.
2. The soldier turned husband would force himself on his captive turned wife even if she was resistant to his advances.
3. The soldier was just a sex-crazed barbarian who was determined to get his fulfillment no matter what.
There are many stories from WWII, Korea, and Vietnam where soldiers found brides from among the people, even sometimes the conquered people. I think you are reading cruelties and barbarism into a text where it isn't necessarily there. I'm sure some guys were jerks (there are always some, unfortunately), but that doesn't mean the system was based on a "right to rape" premise.
> This is a commonly-recited proposition even more commonly misapplied. The absence of expected evidence is regularly and appropriately taken as evidence of absence, in much the same way as I know there's not a tiger in my office chair right now because I'm sitting in it and I don't see a tiger.
We must make some distinctions here. If I'm walking my dog in a dog park, and I look around and see no tigers, I can logically conclude that absence of evidence is indeed evidence of absence. I have sufficient access to the situation to judge reliably. Now imagine that you strain your ears and hear only dogs and their owners, as well as the faint sound of traffic in the distance. So you observe, "It appears that no dog whistles are being blown today." Would it be reasonable for you to conclude this? Not in this case. In this case the absence of evidence does not warrant evidence of absence because you do not have sufficient access to the situation to judge reliably. Even if the dog whistles had been blowing, you would not have heard them. In other words, we are entitled to move from an "appears" claim to a claim about what is *likely* to be the case only when a certain condition is satisfied. In other words, a move from “It appears there is no x” to “Therefore there is probably no x” is entitled only if the following condition is satisfied: If there were an x, we would probably know it.
You can judge there is no tiger in your office chair because if there were, it would be evident. In contrast, if evidence of an ancient event is warranted but not yet discovered, it is not *necessarily* evident. The condition "if there were an x, we would probably know it" is not completely satisfied.
For instance, Hoffmeier (Egyptologists) points out that Aper el's name was the first of a high ranking, Semite official to be found in Egypt (it was found at Sakkara in the late 80s), even though Sakkara has been excavated and explored for more than a century. "If such a high ranking official as Vizier Aper el was completely unknown to modern scholarship until the late 1980s, despite the fact that he lived in one of the better documented periods of Egyptian history [fourteenth century], and was buried in arguably the most excavated site in Egypt, it is wrong to demand, as some have, that direct archaeological evidence for Joseph should be available if he were in fact a historical figure." This is even more the case, he says, because Joseph lived during a period when surviving Egyptian documents of any kind are sparse and because Joseph operated in the Nile Delta, an area that remains "underexcavated" to this day.
If we take that same science and apply it to the Exodus, we see distinctive proof that "The condition 'if there were an x, we would probably know it' is not completely satisfied."
> Fundamentally speaking, it actually is. Deduction is a great way of determining whether the assumed truth of a premise or set of premises necessarily entails the truth of some conclusion, but outside of those instances where some proposition can be shown to lead to a contradiction, empirical investigation is the only workable means of determining whether your premises are true.
Have you ever seen one of those "Magic Eye" pictures—a flurry of computer lines (usually geometric patterns), and when you stare at them long enough in the right way a 3-dimensional images emerges? We look at the particulars of the picture, but we also look beyond them, and even ignore them. Once the image comes clear, we can actually look right at it. This is a more accurate picture of knowledge than simple deduction. The goal is to see a coherent pattern, and we do it through clues, focus, and integration. Whether we are figuring why a faucet is dripping, or looking for clues to the biblical Exodus, recognizing a familiar face or learning to play the piano, we rely on body experiences, integrate all the input data, and come to knowledge. Even the generating of a hypothesis to begin the process of scientific inquiry is not an act of deductive reasoning. The human effort that generates true thinking and true knowledge is different from deduction, as is illustrated by the Magic Eye integration. In a limited view of knowing, the only approved method of extending knowledge is deduction. In deductive reasoning you move from statements that are called premises to a statement called a conclusion. The conclusion of a deductive argument follows necessarily from the premises: if the premises are true, then conclusion has to be true also. This is what we call an inferential connection. What actually happens in the act of knowing is that the relationship between clues and pattern, subsidiaries and focus, is not one of premises and deduced conclusion. When you see a Magic Eye picture, you cannot fully express in words all the particulars on which you rely, nor all that the focus includes, let alone a step-by-step procedure you followed to move from the one to the other. You cannot express the particulars as premises because prior to the actual act of integration—before the Magic Eye picture came clear—you are in no position to articulate the very things that you must rely on if you are to integrate to the pattern.
Deduction certainly has its places and uses, but it's far from all knowledge. Deductivism is an approach to reasoning called "falsificationism," by which we falsify the elements that do not belong in the set under study. We cannot logically prove "all swans are white," no matter how many swans we see, but we can logically *disprove* it if we see even just one black swan. That's how science and deductive reasoning work.
But there is also inductive reasoning, abductive reasoning, abstract reasoning, and integration. Deductive can't begin to tell you if i felt chilly yesterday, if I think Jimmy Fallon is funny, or if I saw a sunset 3 evenings ago that I consider to be beautiful. Fundamentally speaking, empiricism isn't even close to being the only path to knowledge, and may not even be the best path.
> You appear to have conceded that these women are being married to and penetrated by their captors without their consent ever being sought or obtained.
You are making some assumptions that may be unwarranted:
1. The soldier was unfeeling towards the situation and demeanor of the woman.
2. The soldier turned husband would force himself on his captive turned wife even if she was resistant to his advances.
3. The soldier was just a sex-crazed barbarian who was determined to get his fulfillment no matter what.
There are many stories from WWII, Korea, and Vietnam where soldiers found brides from among the people, even sometimes the conquered people. I think you are reading cruelties and barbarism into a text where it isn't necessarily there. I'm sure some guys were jerks (there are always some, unfortunately), but that doesn't mean the system was based on a "right to rape" premise.