I'm pretty confident I grasp the "other universes" argument. The problem with it is that it has no substance, no support, and no credibility at this point. It is totally speculative without cause, and possible specious. The argument has no reference point.

If there are other universes, just to play along, you can't know that each one has its own set of physical constants. If the evolution of any given universe is by chance based on whatever causality, you can't assume physical constants. Nor can you presume that the number of universes is infinite. At this point it's a total non-argument. I might as well say, "Just suppose there are pink unicorns on other planets, and let's suppose that each planet is color-coordinated to..." We can't go there; it's all made-up. So also the multiverses argument and its alleged characteristics of constants and capability to support life. You postulate it as an example of one way in which the physical sentence can be fine tuned without the need for a designer, but you're basing your argument on fictitious premises. The bottom line is that we only really know about the cards we have in our hand, and that we exist in a universe characterized by fine-tuned physical constants, and everything we know of that has the characteristics of design was in fact designed, which leads to the strong possibility (or even probability) that the universe was probably designed as well.

Again, to go along with your argument, IF there are many universes (totally unknown) with different constants (totally unknown), the probability that one or more of them may also appear fine-tuned may be high (for the sake of argument). But again, how does that affect the probability that *our* universe, *this particular* universe, is fine-tuned? If I get four aces every time I'm the dealer, it is possible, of course, that I'm not cheating, but the others around the table won't buy the probability of that explanation.

But suppose there are many universes. Scientists suppose that there is life elsewhere in our universe, and then, theoretically, in other universes as well. Neither of these is an argument against theism. So also if this universe shows characteristics of fine-tuning, and possibly others do as well. It's still true that the theistic argument has a greater possibility of being true than the atheistic one.

The real point of the argument is that the fine-tuning we see in parts of the universe is consistent with the idea of an intelligent God who has caused it to be, and not as consistent with the random explosive processes of a Big Bang. If God wanted to created human life in a universe at all like our, he would necessarily have fine-tuned the constants. On the other hand, the view that these constants have their values by change is less probable.

It's true that if the universe were not fine-tuned, we wouldn't be here to discuss it, but how's that an objection to the argument? The fact of the elements of balance and fine-tuning call for an explanation. Ultimately, fine tuning is more to be expected given theism than given atheism.

> Even if other universes display similar or dissimilar characteristics, that has nothing to do with our universe.

I think maybe you're not quite grasping the other universes argument. An infinite number of universes come into existence (How? We don't know.) and each one has its own set of physical constants. Since the number of universes is infinite, and the value of the constants is random, it is guaranteed that an infinite number of those universes will be able to support life, and an infinite number will not be able to support life. It makes no difference that the universes have nothing to do with each other. Also I'm not arguing in favour of this hypothesis, I only mention it as an example of one way in which the physical constants can be fine tuned without the need for a designer. You can't point to the fine tuned physical constants and say "See? It was designed." There are other ways that that can happen.

The argument of other universes is basically a non-argument. Regardless of what other universes may exist (a pretty wild speculation at this point in the game), it doesn't change the characteristics of our universe, which displays characteristics of fine tuning, and therefore probable design. We may be playing poker in a tournament, and someone at the next table is cheating, but that has nothing to do with us. Even if other universes display similar or dissimilar characteristics, that has nothing to do with our universe. And we're still left with the question of what is popping out universes into existence? What is the causative mechanism? Multiverses still need first causes. But since we know nothing of other universes, let alone of their nature or characteristics, this is an argument that takes you nowhere, for as of now it has no substance.

As far as where the designer came from, you must be familiar with the cosmological arguments for the universe. Scientists are telling us with quite a bit of confidence, based on the math of the Big Bang as well as observations with the Hubble Telescope, that the universe had a beginning. Kalam's argument goes like this:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

2. The universe began to exist.

3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

We know of nothing that at one time began to exist spontaneously of its own volition (How can something have volition if it doesn't exist?). We know of nothing that at any time began to exist from its own nature (How can something pop itself into existence when it doesn't exist?). Everything that had a beginning was brought into existence by something else that already existed, whether technological, mechanical, or even biological. Even biological things came from other biological things, or at least from something that already existed. So what caused the universe to begin to exist? It has to have had a cause. God is a reasonable choice as to that cause. (He's certainly not an unreasonable one, unless someone has already made up in their mind that he doesn't exist, in which case even a watertight argument won't win them over.)

There are other cosmological arguments.

1. Everything that begins to exist at some point in time exists because something else caused it to come into existence. That’s sensible: Somebody made your car. The tree came from somewhere. Even you came from somewhere. Everything that we see around us that ever had a beginning was caused by something else before it. All science would support this statement, knowing that things don’t just pop into existence all by themselves.

2. Since that's the case, it would make sense that there is at least one thing that's in a different class from "things that began to exist"—the class of "things that always existed and didn't have a beginning.” Since everything we know by scientific evidence began to exist (even the universe), a reasonable explanation (and perhaps the only one) is that something that did not have a beginning was the cause of all that had a beginning to their existence. That's not an irrational conclusion.

3. Therefore it makes sense that there has to be at least one thing that didn't have a beginning that started it all. Something had to be there that was always there.

4. God is a reasonable possibility for what started it all, since nature and matter had a beginning. (Scientists readily admit and agree that nature and matter had a beginning.)

The point in this explanation is that if science is right that the universe had a beginning, something had to have existed before the Big Bang to make the bang go bang. While no one can guarantee (prove) that God was the cause, it's reasonable to consider Him a strong and logical candidate. After all, it doesn't make as much sense that whatever existed way back there was just matter. The theory of the Big Bang is that before the bang there was an infinitesimally small point with no dimension and no matter, where the laws of physics as we know them were not in operation. If so, God is the more sensible and simple explanation (Occam's Razor) of causality.

One more.

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in its own nature or from an external cause. Right? We can reason back to explain the existence of planes, trains and automobiles, of trees, flowers, the birds and the bees.

2. That means, then, that there's an explanation of the universe's existence. But if the universe started with nothing (Big Bang), the best explanation for the universe's existence is something outside of the universe, not from its own nature.

3. Therefore, the best explanation of the universe's existence is God.

Behind this one lies an assumption that, taken back far enough, science as a discipline and in its laws breaks down. Since the Big Bang is neither observable or reproducible, it's outside of the scope of observational science. It can only be reasoned mathematically—abstractly—, but logically. Second, it is the consensus of science right now that the laws of physics were not in effect until after the Bang. From that vantage point, no explanation for the universe can be found from its own existence. What is more logical is that it had a causative mechanism external to itself. While alternatives for what that mechanism was are continually theorized and discussed, God is not an irrational choice among the options.

That's why you can't cut out the middle man and just say the same for the universe. We have to infer to the most reasonable conclusion, and the existence of the universe without the middle man doesn't make as much sense.

If there are an infinite number of universes, each with it's own set of physical constants, life will arise only in the ones where the constants allow it. Ours is one of those. That's just one possible explanation and I'm sure there are more, but almost all of them are wrong. You obviously think your explanation is the right one. I don't.

The obvious problem with attributing apparent coincidences to a designer is it raises the question of where the designer came from. If you say "He has always existed in a perfect state" why can't you just say the same for the universe? Cut out the middle man.

Brandon Carr and Martin Rees: "The basic features of galaxies, stars, planets, and the everyday world are essentially determined by a few microphysical constants and by the effects of gravitation….several aspects of our Universe—some of which seem to be prerequisites for the evolution of any form of life—depend rather delicately on apparent 'coincidences' among the physical constants." For example, if the force of gravity were even slightly stronger, all stars would be blue giants; if even slightly weaker, all would be red dwarfs; in neither case could life have developed. The same goes for the weak and strong nuclear forces; if either had been even slightly different, life, at any rate life even remotely similar to the sort we have, could probably not have developed.

Stephen Hawking says that "reduction of the rate of expansion by one part in 10^12 at the time when the temperature of the Universe was 10^10 K would have resulted in the Universe starting to recollapse when its radius was only 1/3000 of the present value and the temperature was still 10,000 deg"—much too warm for comfort. Hawking concludes that life is possible only because the universe is expanding at just the rate required to avoid collapse. At an earlier time, the fine-tuning had to be even more remarkable: "We know that there has to have been a very close balance between the competing effect of explosive expansion and gravitational contraction which, at the very earliest epoch about which we can even pretend to speak (called the Planck time, 10^-43 sec. after the big bang) would have corresponded to the incredible degree of accuracy represented by a deviation in their ratio from unity by only one part in 10^60" (- John Polkinghorne). Paul Davies: "The fact that these relations are necessary for our existence is one of the most fascinating discoveries of modern science."

If we're playing poker, and when I deal I get 4 aces and wild card, you'd be suspicious, but it would be OK, maybe. But if it happened again in the next hand you'd really look at me funny, and if it happened a third time you'd know the odds were so strongly against it you'd be sure I was cheating. Take that same logic to the universe.

I'm not saying that it's impossible for such realities to arise from natural selection, but that they seem more likely from design. Given the two possible sources, theism is the more reasonable conclusion. As you say, it's not as if there is an absolute need for a designer, but given what we know of the world (some characteristics of design, harmony and balance, order, regularity, purpose, reliability, personality), theism is the more reasonable conclusion than atheism.

> there are critical pieces of the universe that have characteristics of design.

What are those characteristics? Complexity and being well suited to fit a niche (anything else?). The question is, can these things arise from random fluctuations combined with natural selection, and I think the answer is yes. There is absolutely no need for the designer hypothesis. It just adds an inexplicable layer to the puzzle that is entirely unnecessary, and my intuition does not take me there.

Yeah, I know it was long. thanks for your patience. It's just if I only say half of what needs to be said, it has too many holes in it. But if I say it all, it's a truckload dumped on you. Sorry.

The point is that eventually, no matter what the pursuit, evidences ultimately fail. I've read books on the philosophy of science, and they debunk even simple empirical observations. Fascinating stuff, and I'm reluctant to go that far, but I know what they mean. I know Christians get slaughtered because their arguments are not 100% air-tight, but the issue is that they are far superior to anything else out there. The argument is that with so many variables, perspectives, and alternatives, we have to infer to the most reasonable conclusion, even if evidences are less than 100%. The way I said it was "that for any person there are direct arguments for the propositions in question, and given that there is no comparable evidence against them, they must be more probable than not on his total evidence. The bulk of my commonsense beliefs about minds and mental states must be more probable than not on my total evidence." In other words, I have to infer to the most reasonable conclusion, use common sense (not just philosophy and argument), assume certain presuppositions (without which I can hardly jump off the starting blocks), and if the arguments against what I am thinking from those points aren't nearly as strong, I should go with the strongest case.

As far as design is concerned, the idea behind that is that when we see something that shows purpose in the way it works (the proverbial watch on the beach, or even a chair or a car, or a door), we always find out that somebody designed this thing to be a watch, chair, car, or door. From our experience, the things that look like they've been designed and have characteristics of design have indeed been designed. That's intuitive, common sense, and empirical. We can't always guarantee it, but we can infer to a reasonable conclusion. the argument goes: there are critical pieces of the universe that have characteristics of design. Certainly not every piece in the universe (far from it), but big things, in critical places, bear the marks of design. Intuition, reason, and empiricism take us to the most reasonable conclusion: they are possibly designed, and logic would say so. I'm not claiming that necessarily ARE the product of intelligent design, but they sure exhibit characteristics of it. And if they do, it's logical to proceed to the conclusion that not only possibly, but probably they are.

Contingency: As far as metaphysics (the science of being), contingent means it's dependent on something else for its existence. As far as logic, it means it's neither logically necessary or logically impossible. So all Moreland is saying is that the physical states and the mental states don't give evidence of some kind of necessary connection between the two. They more seem to have characteristics of being separate entities.

Corrigible means changeable. Plantinga is saying that we are wise to hold positions, even though they are not ultimately provable (not logically necessary), as long as they make good sense (not logically impossible), and we are willing to change those beliefs as evidence arises, even if we can't absolutely prove how we absolutely know it's true. We infer to the most logical conclusion, and it's OK to do that. We all do.

> The important phrase here is "thus far"

But then you're basing your conclusion not on information or evidence, but on faith that "Well I believe it anyway, and maybe someday resolution will come." You say consciousness is an emergent property of the brain, but, as Moreland said, "no naturalistic explanation postulated thus far has been capable of accounting for how the mental can arise from the physical." If we go with what we know, it will lead us far closer to a theistic conclusion than a naturalist one. But if you want to go by blind faith, then you go the naturalist route.

> " If the explanation is personal, then it is theistic." How so? Did you leave out a couple of steps here? What did I miss?

Because science claims an impersonal beginning, and that there is nothing personal in the sequence until it mysteriously arises inexplicably and illogically from matter (physical stuff). Everything started from mass, energy, or motion—all equally impersonal. And if everything is impersonal, there is no meaning in any of the particulars. Nothing has any meaning.

But if we are going to claim personality, it makes more sense that there was a personal source. In this case it makes sense that man is person, and that particulars have meaning. There is such a thing as purpose (purpose can only exist with a free agent as the source). Therefore if the explanation is personal, then it is theistic.

> "The conditional probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given naturalism together with the proposition that we have come to be by way of evolution, is low." Why do you say that?

Because all we have at play in the system is random mutations plus natural selection. And if it's random mutations, I can neither postulate purpose or reliability in it. If my iPhone is playing songs on shuffle, I can never say, when a second good song comes up: "Good decision." It wasn't a decision. We're on random. And if "random" is the only player in the system, even thoughts that come to my head are random. Can I trust them? Who knows—they were by presupposition and definition random. Are they reliable? It's an idiotic question. Anything that arises from impersonal, mechanistic, random processes is by definition impersonal, mechanistic, and random. "Trust", truth, or purpose, are concepts that have nothing to do with anything. We mutate; we survive. Mutations happen at the molecular level, but natural selection happens at the organism level—and the two are both blind processes based in survival. Nothing is "reliable". That's like asking if a cloud formation is "reliable." No, it's random, that's all. Can we trust our thoughts to be reliable beliefs or giving us truth? Wrong question. Not reasonable in the system you've built. It's only reasonable if there is reason in the system.

> This conception could be an illusion.

It could be, but we have to infer to the most reasonable conclusion.

> Do you think Chimpanzees have a soul? How about dogs? Snails? Single cell amoebas? Algae? Plants? Rocks? Have you said no yet? If you have, where did you draw the line, and why did you draw it there?

The question of a soul is a different conversation. Let's not get the two tangled up.

That's quite a lot to chew on in one mouthful, so I'll just address a few things that stood out for me:

I'm with you as far as "and we call this 'knowledge'. After that I get a bit lost.

"and is such that we know whether or not it was the product of intelligent design"

How can we know if something is the product of intelligent design? It sounds to me like you might be begging the question here.

"contingent, corrigible"

I don't know what those words mean.

"no naturalistic explanation postulated thus far has been capable of accounting for how the mental can arise from the physical."

The important phrase here is "thus far". The conventional view of the scientific community is consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. We don't know the mechanism by which this happens but some researchers believe that if current progress continues we will know within a decade or two. Ray Kurtzweil says that when (not if) we build computers that have the same capacity and are modeled on the same patterns and structures as the human brain, those computers will be conscious. Interesting times lie ahead.

> no amount of restructuring of the primal physical stuff of the universe can produce something as distinct as mental states.

> there seems to be no inherent connection between the mental states to the physical states on which they depend.

I think most scientists would disagree with both of these statements.

> The causal closure of physical states

I don't know what this means.

> consciousness is not necessary to survival, as any tree will tell you.

Consciousness is not necessary for trees to survive but it is necessary for higher mammals to survive.

> If the explanation is personal, then it is theistic.

How so? Did you leave out a couple of steps here? What did I miss?

>Our sense of self (and perception of self, not just in thought, but as an entity) gives evidence that we have a conception of an immaterial self.

This conception could be an illusion. There is no reason to think that we exist separate from our brains, and will continue to exist after the brain dies.

> The conditional probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given naturalism together with the proposition that we have come to be by way of evolution, is low.

Why do you say that?

> as evidenced by genuine "near death" experiences

Near death experiences don't tell us that our consciousness continues to exist after our brain dies. They only tell us what imagery the brain produces when it begins to shut down. Actual death experiences would answer the question for us, but of course we don't have that information and we have no way of getting it.

Do you think Chimpanzees have a soul? How about dogs? Snails? Single cell amoebas? Algae? Plants? Rocks? Have you said no yet? If you have, where did you draw the line, and why did you draw it there?

There are many, but let's start with a double argument that's both analogical and teleological (credits for this argument go to Alvin Plantinga). According to Kant (and Descartes and others), we can safely presume our own existence and the existence of others. We know that we are not alone in the world because we know there are other people in it. We also believe that we have a mind that can reason, and also that they have a mind that can reason, feel, remember, intuit, etc. Yet when it comes right down to it, I have absolutely no concrete evidence of anyone else's mind. I can never really tell if they think, what they are truly feeling, if their pain is real and what it is like, etc., and yet I suppose it's true. I can never determine by observation that someone else is in a particular mental state. I can construct a sound inductive argument for the conclusion that I am not the only being that thinks and reasons, has sensations and feelings—an argument whose premises state certain facts about my own mental life and about physical objects (including human bodies), but do not entail the existence of minds or mental states that are not my own. This analogy is as good an answer as we have to the question "Do we know, and how do we know, the thoughts and feelings of others?" When it comes right down to it, other minds are inaccessible to me, and their attributes are similarly inaccessible. I have no observational proof of them. And yet we live life fully convinced that there are other people, that they have thoughts and feelings, and that our perceptions and analyses of such things are both reasonable and to varying extents accurate. We generally accept what people say at face value. If they say they went for a walk yesterday, we assume some truth and infer by attitude that he went for a walk. Humans can remember past actions and learn language, and we call this "knowledge".

This analogical argument strongly resembles the teleological argument for the existence of God, though no argument is lock-tight. I cannot perceive someone else's mental state of pain, nor can I determine by observation that someone is in pain, and yet I nevertheless have or can easily acquire evidence for such propositions that some other person is in pain and that some person is feeling pain in a bodily area in which I feel nothing. Evidences ultimately fail. With so many variables, what the analogy holds here is that for any person there are direct arguments for the propositions in question, and given that there is no comparable evidence against them, they must be more probable than not on his total evidence. The bulk of my commonsense beliefs about minds and mental states must be more probable than not on my total evidence. I have evidence that other sentient beings exist, but that's not enough to confirm that they experience anger, joy, depression, and pain, as well as hold beliefs. It's neither necessary nor possible that I am able to observe such entities to be able to assume truth.

So is the belief in God rational? The atheist has no argument to substantiate their own position. The teleological position of theism is strong, though not air-tight, but far more satisfactory than anything an atheist has ever offered. Given that there are no completely provable positions, we must conclude that a person may rationally hold a contingent, corrigible belief even if there is no answer to the relevant epistemological question. The strongest version of the teleological argument is:

1. Everything that exhibits curious adaptation of means to ends and is such that we know whether or not it was the product of intelligent design, in fact was the product of intelligent design.

2. The universe exhibits curious adaptation of means to ends.

3. Therefore the universe is probably the product of intelligent design.

Inferring to the most logical conclusion, if my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God.

As you know, there are many other arguments for the rationality of a belief in God (cosmological, teleological, ontological. axiological, etc.) Together they create a formidable rationality for belief in God: God makes sense causally, as far as purpose, as far as personality, morally, consciousness, design, and

Here is Moreland’s argument from consciousness:

1. Genuinely nonphysical mental states exist (feelings, thoughts, emotions). (If you deny the existence of mental states, all discourse becomes unintelligible and absurd.)

2. There is an explanation for the existence of mental states, either personal or scientific.

3. Personal explanation is different from natural scientific explanation. Personal explanations intent to account for specific events or results by appealing to a free, moral agent.

4. The explanation is not a natural scientific one, for no naturalistic explanation postulated thus far has been capable of accounting for how the mental can arise from the physical.

a. The uniformity of nature: no amount of restructuring of the primal physical stuff of the universe can produce something as distinct as mental states.

b. The contingency of the mind-body correlation: there seems to be no inherent connection between the mental states to the physical states on which they depend.

c. The causal closure of physical states

d. The inadequacy of evolutionary explanations, because consciousness is not necessary to survival, as any tree will tell you.

5. Therefore, the explanation is a personal one.

6. If the explanation is personal, then it is theistic.

7. Therefore, the explanation is theistic.

As Plantinga say, Given that there are no completely provable position, it can be reasonably concluded that a person may hold a contingent, corrigible belief even if there is no answer to the relevant epistemological question. While the theist cannot give an airtight evidence for the existence of God, the belief of the theist is by no means irrational. By contrast, though, the atheist's answer is even less satisfactory.

What proofs do you have for the existence of God?