by jimwalton » Fri Aug 12, 2016 11:58 am
Cognitive dissonance? Not at all. We all have to presuppose the existence of something. All questions of existence—or, more accurately, knowledge of existence—are fundamentally presuppositional. We have to make at least a few assumptions to get on with it, or we cannot even begin. If nothing else, I must presuppose that I can reason, and that reasoning can bring me to a place of considered truth. In order to know a thing, we have to know what it is, and we also have to know HOW we know what it is. To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedure is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know know whether it really does succeed unless we already know which appearances are true and which ones are false. And so we are left to recognize some presuppositions. Is that cognitive dissonance? If so, then we all do that, and we can proceed. If not, then let's proceed.
You can't verify your procedure without first having knowledge, but you can't get any knowledge without first verifying your procedure. I'm all in on Kant, which means I would say the only option is to pick one or the other and run with it (choose a procedure that you assume but cannot prove will yield true knowledge, like positivism does with science; or choose some tenets of knowledge that you assume are true even though you can't verify them, which is called foundationalism and is the process used in nearly all of philosophy). The way to verify (or contest) truth in a Kantian system isn't to verify (or contest) the first principles, but to test for coherence: a system based on faulty assumptions (or an inaccurate procedure) will eventually either contradict reality, or contradict itself.
In other words, I am not merely presupposing the existence of a god because I think the arguments for his existence are far stronger than the arguments against his existence, and the arguments in favor of his existence are abductively sound. Beyond the recognition that theism is a rational pursuit, the credibility of the biblical record (with which I am confident you disagree) and its coherence with known facts about history and geography, as revealed by archaeology, and its making sense of the world and of life (among other things) convincing me of the veracity of Christianity, a specific theistic worldview. Having arrived at those conclusions from both the presuppositional and evidentiary branches, then I accept the Bible as a reliable revelation of God's character, part of which is that he hears and answers prayer. Therefore the argument does not collapse. My evaluation of God's actions are still based in judicatory reason and the evidence that time affords (the record of the Bible as a valid interpretation of history), and not just on presuppositions alone.
As far as prayers being confirmation bias, there is no logical ground on which that accusation stands. First of all, to establish confirmation bias we must first be able to construct a standard by which we can objectively identify what answers to prayer can scientifically be verified, and what we can reasonably expect as a line of demarcation between legitimate answers to prayer and contrived answers to prayer. Construction of such a standard is impossible, and therefore you cannot legitimately claim answers to prayer are confirmation bias.
Secondly, to claim confirmation bias you must be able to identify what circumstantial events are answers to prayer and which are not, which is impossible for you. There is no way to know all of what anyone anywhere is praying, and there is no way to identify with scientific certainty which events (or parts of events) are acts of God and which are not. Therefore you cannot legitimately claim answers to prayer are confirmation bias. As far as you or anyone else is concerned, they may actually be answers to prayer. In other words, the accusation of confirmation bias is an empty accusation that takes us nowhere in the discussion of the legitimacy of prayer and discerning answers.
As far as verifiable facts about the existence of God, you know as well as I that "verifiable facts" are not the only way to discern reality. Is time a verifiable fact, or a subjective and perceptual phenomenon by which we measure existence? It has no materiality, nor any verifiability, but we perceive it and reason by it. And what about relational realities such as love, forgiveness, kindness, etc., all of which exist but have nothing to do with verifiable facts? What about social constructs like justice, peace, anarchy, or law? They are not verifiable facts, but recognizable states of being by which we, again, perceive our environments. Your demand for a "verifiable fact" is using the wrong standard of measure for the wrong item, like trying to measure miles per gallon by using fahrenheit. In the case of God we must infer the most reasonable conclusion, not do a scientific experiment.