by jimwalton » Thu May 08, 2014 7:56 am
While I appreciate your thoughts, I fear there are some severe double standards and self-contradictions in your position. First of all, I too determine truth by observation, evaluation, and questioning all the available evidence. Your question, as you recall, was determining the distinction between literal and parable, which is different than the epistemological question of how I know what I know and why I consider that to be reliable. It's inconsistent (no disrespect intended) for you to weigh scientific method in the determination of truth against a specific question of how can I tell what is parable and what is not. I don't advocate fideism, which is sounds as if you are assuming. My epistemic position is more equivalent to reformed epistemology. It's not about faith vs. reason, but about rationality (evidence, scientific method) informed by experience. Evidence is crucial to reliable knowledge, but all knowledge is not evidentiary. If Christianity is true, God is capable of giving us a personal spiritual experience of him. Atheists can’t say that—they can’t have a personal experience of atheism; they are totally dependent on material evidence. I'm attracted to the sensitivity principle in which knowledge is informed by both evidence and belief.
My main objection, however, is the inherent and necessary conflict between naturalism and truth. Natural materialists make truth statements (There is no god, there is no spiritual world, there is no life after death—religious statements to be sure), but on what basis? Our cognitive faculties of memory, perception, intuition, sympathy, etc., work together in complex ways to produce what we call belief (there is no god, I think it's hot in here) and knowledge (2+2=4). On what grounds can I consider these (or any observations) to be true? My memory or intuitions, for example, (but even my observational skills) are reliable only if they produce mostly true beliefs. A theist such as myself naturally believes that our cognitive faculties are reliable because God made us this way. But as an atheist, there is no such person, and no such source of truth. Your cognitive faculties have been cobbled together by natural selection. Can you then sensibly (reasonably) consider your thoughts to be reliable? First, If naturalism and evolution are both true, our cognitive faculties would very likely not be reliable—the probability is low. And if the probability that your cognitions are reliable is low, then any belief you hold is suspect. Therefore, there is reason to doubt your belief in materialism. You cannot rationally accept a position when reason is suspect.
Nietzsche said, “Only if we assume a God who is morally our like can “truth” and the search for truth be at all something meaningful and promising of success. This God left aside, the question is permitted whether being deceived is not one of the conditions of life.”
Thomas Nagel said: “If we came to believe that our capacity for objective theory (e.g., true beliefs) were the product of natural selection, that would warrant serious skepticism about its results.”
Barry Stroud: “There is an embarrassing absurdity in [naturalism] that is revealed as soon as the naturalist reflects and acknowledges that he believes his naturalistic theory of the world. … I mean he cannot it and consistently regard it as true.”
Patricia Churchland: “Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four Fs: feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems it to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive. … Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism’s way of life and enhances the organism’s chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.”
Plantinga writes: From an materialist atheist standpoint, what evolution guarantees is at most that we behave in certain ways so as to promote survival, viz., reproductive success. The principal function or purpose, then, of our cognitive faculties is not that of producing true or near true beliefs, but instead that of contributing to survival by getting the body parts in the right place. What evolution underwrites is only (at most) that our behavior is reasonably adaptive to the circumstances in which our ancestors found themselves; hence it doesn’t guarantee true or mostly true beliefs. Our beliefs might be mostly true, but there is no particular reason to think they would be: natural selection is not interested in truth, but in appropriate behavior. What Churchland therefore suggests is that naturalistic evolution—that is, the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism with the view that we and our cognitive faculties have arisen by way of the mechanisms and processes proposed by contemporary evolutionary theory—gives us reason to doubt two things: (a) that a purpose of our cognitive systems is that of serving us with true beliefs, and (b) that they do, in fact, furnish us with mostly true beliefs. Darwin himself said, "With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"
As it turns out, the scientific method is only a reasonable epistemic source given theism, and is self-contradictory given atheism.
I still welcome further conversation.