Board index ‹ God

[jimwalton]

> Deny that "logically infer" means the same thing as "prove", in which case I would need you to explain the difference.

According to the dictionary, "infer" means the process of arriving at some conclusion that, though it is not logically derivable from the assumed premises, possesses some degree of probability relative to the premises. "Prove" goes beyond probability to establishing the truth beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt by evidence or argument.

> Demonstrate an argument that does prove God's existence

No argument proves God's existence. They only show that (1) belief in God is a reasonable conclusion on the basis of logic and evidence, and (2) the arguments for theism are stronger than the arguments for naturalism.

> Abandon the idea of "infer" and provide a separate proof that God is logically possible

We can move on to the next argument, if you wish, but it's not a proof. There is no proof, only arguments that help us infer the most reasonable conclusion.

[Choking]

Infer

Okay, so, then, by "infer", are you referring to arguments that simply increase the probability of God's existence? I have never heard of one. In fact, your previous argument (from causality) attempted to prove God's existence, so I don't see how that's relevant either.

To make sure I understand your argument:

Argument A demonstrate's that God exists (100%). Argument B demonstrates that God is probable (>50%).

If either A or B is based on logic or true premises, then God can be inferred.

Is this about accurate? It seems to me that I've only heard flawed attempts at A, and I don't know if I've ever heard an attempt at B.

And, if that's the case, can you prove premise 4b to be true?

It feels to me like you are very much making an appeal to authority through this "infer" logic. It's up to you to demonstrate that 4a and 4b are true. You can't just rely on arguments from known theists, because I will very likely disagree with their arguments on the basis of flawed logic or untrue premises.

I think this part of the argument has become unnecessary, because I've figured out why we are unable to agree on the idea of logical probability. See the next section.

Logical Possibility

I think you are also conflating different versions of "logically impossible". Just because God is logically possible/impossible with all factors known (his existence) does not demonstrate anything about whether or not he is possible with few factors known (our current knowledge is limited). I'm going to try to demonstrate this with an example later tonight.

Alright, here's an example with dice. I shake a cup with one die in it, then flip it and place it on the table. You can tell by shaking it (sliding it on the table) that there is one die in there. I ask you to tell me the color of the die.

1. If it is a blue die, then it is logically necessary that the correct answer is "Blue". (It can't be switched - it's trapped under the cup - and I'm not cheating.)

2. If it is not a blue die, then it is logically impossible that the correct answer is "Blue". (Again, no switching, no cheating. There simply are no alternatives.)

3. Therefore, it is either logically impossible or logically necessary that the correct answer is "Blue". (So, I've established this same dichotomy by trapping it under the cup.)

4. It is logically possible that the correct answer is "Blue". (There's simply no reason why it wouldn't be. We can make arguments establishing the probability, but there's no reason why we should discount the possibility altogether.)

5. Therefore, it is logically necessary that the correct answer is "Blue".

The problem is that we're dealing with two different concepts of logical possibility, and conflating them. One is true possibility (which, since we're talking about one specific case, can only be 100% or 0% - true or false) and one is the possibility derived from the information that we actually have. We are using the same terminology for each, but they're actually separate ideas.

You see, logical impossibility is when the premises and conclusion cannot both be true. So we begin with:

P: God does not exist.
C: God does exist.

Logically impossible, therefore God is logically impossible

OR

P: God does exist.
C: God does not exist.

Logically impossible, therefore God's nonexistence is impossible, therefore God's existence is necessary.

And then you attempt to show that God is possible therefore God is necessary. However:

P: The die is blue.
C: The die is not blue.

Logically impossible, therefore the die must be blue.

P: The die is not blue.
C: The die is blue.

Logically impossible, therefore the die must not be blue.

But, since it is not impossible for the die to be blue, the second argument cannot apply and the die must be blue. This is absurd, of course, since the opposite argument applies just as well, and we have no actual evidence for the die's color. The problem is that you are presenting [logical impossibility with premise A] and comparing it to [logical impossibility without premise A], and they simply cannot be properly compared.

Argument Reversal

More importantly, though, does the argument not also work the exact same way for his nonexistence? It seems to me that "logically necessary" is the antithesis of "logically impossible", so I see no reason why the argument cannot be flipped on its head. See below.

Argument Structure:

God: a being that which it is not logically possible that there be a greater

Zanybird: a blue-and-orange striped bird with a pink polka-dotted beak that has always existed, and can neither be created nor destroyed

Logically Infer: come to a conclusion using valid logic and true premises

1A. God is unlimited.
1B. A being that is caused or happens would be limited.
1C. Therefore, God cannot be caused or happen (cannot come to be).
1D. Something that does not exist and cannot come to be is impossible.
1. If God does exist, His nonexistence is logically impossible.
2. If God does not exist, His nonexistence is logically necessary.
3. Hence either God's nonexistence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.
4A. It is possible to logically infer God's nonexistence.
4B. If it is possible to logically infer something, then that something is logically possible.
4. The concept of God's nonexistence is not logically impossible.
5. Therefore God's nonexistence is logically necessary.

[jimwalton]

> Okay, so, then, by "infer", are you referring to arguments that simply increase the probability of God's existence? I have never heard of one. In fact, your previous argument (from causality) attempted to prove God's existence

"Infer" reasons that the argument for theism is stronger than the argument for naturalism. My previous argument (from causality) did not attempt to prove God's existence, but only to reason that theism was a stronger logical position than naturalism.

> Argument A demonstrate's that God exists (100%). Argument B demonstrates that God is probable (>50%).

No. Both arguments (all arguments, actually) aim to demonstrate that the existence of God is a more reasonable conclusion than naturalism.

> Just because God is logically possible/impossible with all factors known (his existence) does not demonstrate anything about whether or not he is possible with few factors known (our current knowledge is limited).

The reality is somewhere between your two extremes. We have a lot of knowledge about God, as revealed in the Bible, but certainly nowhere near "all." But we have far more than "few factors known."

> here's an example with dice

Yeah, I get where you're going with this, but it fails in that your example pertains to a particular attribute (color) rather than the necessity of existence. It's an ontological argument ("being") rather than a character argument (attribute of color). You example might be closer if we were dealing with the state of being of the die. The system pertains to conditional ontology (If he exists; if he doesn't exist). Your example takes us in the wrong direction and doesn't fairly represent the situation.

[Choking]

So what if I were to change it to whether there's a ball under the cup? Either the ball exists or it doesn't. The same logic applies.

I wasn't making a point of ontology, though. I'm demonstrating that not all statements of logical possibility are comparable. The ontological argument fails because you're reasoning with two different forms of logical possibility, but treating them as the same. If you want the argument to be accepted, you have to demonstrate that they are comparable.