by Martha » Mon Mar 10, 2014 4:52 pm
This is going to be lengthy, and so I warn you. But i like to give thought out arguments rather than what Aquinas did when he made the argument: "god created out of an abundance/excess of joviality/love." (Or however he wrote it, I've been linked to the summa before and read the arguments, so I'm not mocking exactly what he wrote if that's what you're thinking).
What desire comes from fullness? What love is an expression of perpetuity other than your claim of God?
I read your illustration of your daughter and her adopting another child. I think you may be taking "poverty" a little too literally, or in other words, you're allowing a certain connotation of the word -a negative one- to discolor your analysis of my use of it. Poverty, or a lacking if you will, does not have this meaning you seem to be inferring upon its use in this argument.
First off, to even make a claim that love is quantifiable -as you are doing with this Thomistic argument- is unreasonable.
Secondly, the metaphor of "the fall" is a great demonstration of how ignorance is bliss, and with knowledge comes responsibility and discontentedness of suffering.
Your daughter, with the knowledge that they have of these children -most likely due in part to the world's current state of "interconnectedness"- have a sense of discontentedness, or a lacking of sufficient contentedness, that these children are suffering. The capacity to love is directly inverse to the feeling of being perfect -that is: the more one feels they are perfect, the less capacity they have to love others- and the ones who admit to their imperfections the most, happen to be the ones with the greatest capacity for love. What I argue is that their desire to help these children stems from a lack of contentedness with the knowledge of the condition of those kids' lives. If they had not the knowledge, they would not help the children. Ignorance is bliss. But feigned ignorance is inexcusable (why capitalism is pretty shitty and why Jesus would completely be against it).
This is also another one of my arguments against omnibenevolence in an omnipotent UA: for if he is omniscient and omnipotent (of which the UA is defined to be), there should be no human suffering. Some may argue that people suffer because of other humans, and the problem of evil is solved by God giving us free will. But this completely sweeps under the rug the fact that millions die from natural disasters or natural occurrences -like brain aneurysms- all the time.
I argue that it is the Christian's lack of awareness due to living in such a cushy society such as the US, that allows them to believe in this personal God who hears them, but doesn't hear the millions of others suffering.
Seriously, Jesus was so heavily embraced by people because they were sick of "God on earth," (naturally royal bloodlines, kings, dictatorships). And it's totally understandable that people would die and fight for the idea that the one true ruler must be in the sky and not on earth. Who wouldn't die for that cause? I implore you to empathize with a plebian of roman times. How sick would it make you to hear that some people are just born into holiness and royalty and that you just naturally aren't worth the same? It would make anyone sick. Hence Christianity's popularity, its secrecy at first, and why the Romans killed them in droves. People have forgotten the whole reason why we wanted so badly an immaterial ruler: so that all humans became intrinsically equal. A noble cause it was, but now that we have rowed ashore, to use the boat of religion is to impede our progress.
You said, "god must be omnipotent to be the hypothetical pure potentiality .... I guess we need to talk about omnipotence. I don't understand when you say first that "omnipotence [means] he must have the ability to do anything that is not contradictory to logic, his existence, or his nature," but then you seem to chide God for lacking omnipotent power "if he is not maximal in all logical cases." So help me understand: if omnipotence means he is maximal in all logical cases (not contradictory to logic, existence, or nature), how can you conclude then that he is not maximal in all logical cases and therefore not omnipotent. I'm not trying to be argumentative, I'm just trying to understand what you are saying."
Because you're starting from the unfounded assumption that God, as defined by Thomism must have necessarily created the universe. There are a couple things I'm arguing here:
First, that if God did create the universe, he wasn't omnipotent.
Secondly, that the UA as defined by Thomism is strictly incompatible with the creation of the universe, and what goes on in said universe.
And thirdly, that if Thomism is correct in its hypothetical analysis that the only way that God could exist and have created the universe is if he is the UA, that God necessarily did not create the universe and that there is no God. (But to say Thomism is the only correct interpretation is silly... Right?)
I'm saying an Omnipotent being as defined by Thomism, the UA if you will, isn't contradictory in terms of logic, his nature, or his existence. It is only contradictory in light of the claim that he has anything to do with the existence of the universe and mankind.