by jimwalton » Thu Sep 10, 2015 4:40 pm
All you have come upon is the reality that sometimes very very smart people disagree with each other when it comes to philosophical science. Your link acknowledges that the fine tuning argument is advocated by a half dozen brilliant people, and yet he proposes a rebuttal to their argument. So is it bias that motivates you to choose your author over the half a dozen others? The arguments by Swinburne and Plantinga are as worthy as the arguments by your link, so it's a matter of what the reader chooses to believe more than the actual strength of the arguments.
When it comes right down to it, the essence of the argument from design filters down to this: We know that we are not alone in the world because we know there are other people in it. We also believe that they have a mind that can reason, feel, remember, intuit, etc. Yet when it comes right down to it, I have absolutely no concrete evidence of what is going on in anyone else's mind. I can never really tell if they think, what they are truly feeling, if their pain is real and what it is like, etc., and yet I suppose it's true. I can never determine by observation that someone else is in a particular mental state. I was being fitted for glasses not long ago, and the doctor had to keep asking me what I was seeing. No matter how fancy his equipment is, he can never truly know what it is that I see.
I can construct a sound inductive argument for the conclusion that I am not the only being that thinks and reasons, has sensations and feelings—an argument whose premises state certain facts about my own mental life and about physical objects around me (including human bodies), but do not entail the existence of minds or mental states that are not my own. This analogy is as good an answer as we have to the question "Do we know, and how do we know, the thoughts and feelings of others?" When it comes right down to it, other minds are inaccessible to me, and their attributes (like pain or sight) are similarly inaccessible. I have no observational proof of them. And yet we live life fully convinced that there are other people, that they have thoughts and feelings, and that our perceptions and analyses of such things are both reasonable and to varying extents accurate. We generally accept what people say at face value. If they say they went for a walk yesterday, we assume some truth and infer by attitude that he did indeed go for a walk. Humans can remember past actions and learn language.
This argument is like the teleological argument for the existence of God, though nothing is lock-tight. I cannot perceive someone else's mental state of pain, nor can I determine by observation that someone is in pain, and yet I nevertheless have or can easily acquire evidence that some other person is in pain and that some person is feeling pain in a bodily area in which I feel nothing. Concrete scientific evidences ultimately fail. With so many variables, what the analogy holds here is that for any person there are direct arguments for the propositions in question, and given that there is no comparable evidence against them, they must be more probable than not on his total evidence. The bulk of my commonsense beliefs about minds and mental states must be more probable than not on my total evidence. I have evidence that other sentient beings exist, but that's not enough to confirm that they experience anger, joy, depression, and pain, as well as hold beliefs. It's neither necessary nor possible that I am able to observe such entities to be able to assume truth.
So is the belief in God rational (which is what the argument from design claims)? The atheist has no argument to substantiate their own position. The teleological answer is strong, though not air-tight, but far more satisfactory than anything an atheist has ever offered. Given that there are no completely provable positions, we must conclude that a person may rationally hold a contingent, corrigible belief in the existence of a deity even if there is no answer to the relevant epistemological question. The strongest version of the teleological arg:
1. We don’t know of anything that shows purposeful design that wasn’t purposefully designed. Whenever we know of something that exhibits purpose (a reason for why it exists or why something happened the way it did), and whenever we know whether it not it was the product of intelligent design (somebody thought it up and made it happen), it was indeed the designed product of an intelligent being. Whether a watch, a washer, or a window, if we can infer that there was a purpose behind it, it’s safe to say that an intelligent being designed it for that purpose, or at least for a purpose.
2. There are many parts of the universe, the earth, and life as we know it that exhibit purpose—not just parts of the universe exhibit purpose, though, but the universe itself.
3. Therefore, it's logical to assume that the universe may probably be the product of intelligent design. Everything else we know that exhibits those characteristics was indeed designed; why should the universe be treated any differently?
If my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God. The argument from design is a sound one, though others may give sound refutations and arguments as well. Each person has to examine the evidence and make their own decisions, but pursued to their logical conclusions, the rationality of a designer is not less likely than no designer. Even in that article it said that 99.9999999 percent of the universe was hostile to life. Odd that our little speck is well-suited to it. That all by itself calls for the question, "How did that happen?" One oasis in the middle of an endless desert calls for more explanation than, "Gee, that was lucky."