> I agree only if in order to qualify as a god it is eternal.
I would regard eternality as a necessary characteristic of a truly divine being.
> However history is filled with non eternal Gods.
Yeah, they're posers, fakes, pretenders to the throne.
> Even Yahweh is debated to have originated from El Elon and Sheerah. Ba'al and Yahweh were their children.
I'm aware of the debate. I don't buy it. In my mind, similarity doesn't equal derivation. Just because a scholar finds some parallels doesn't mean one derived from the other, and there is no actual proof of derivation.
> I disagree however that Yahweh in your definition of him couldn't create another equally powerful God. Since He is perfect. If he decided to create such an entity it logically doesn't follow that he wouldn't be able to. The only difference would be one has a recorded birth.
My problem with your theory is the coexistence of two all-powerful beings, especially if those two all-powerful beings are at odds with each other. Their very coexistence and conflict would necessitate that one of them would not be able to "bring about whatever is possible, no matter how many possibilities there are," to never be overwhelmed, frustrated, or contained. It's like "What would happen if a non-stoppable object came into contact with an immoveable wall?" We have a necessary defeater (and inherent logical and practical contradiction) for the possibility.
> However since we don't have any examples of something consistently existing throughout all of time.
What about energy? matter? gravity? Just wondering.
> He is able without logical limitation yet cannot interfere with man because of free will. I think you might want to re-read through it again and think about that part before responding back.
I don't need to. If God granted to man (or, as is my opinion, free will is a necessity [but that's a different conversation]) free will, then if God interferes with that free will, then it's not free, and it's not will. Interference is abrogation. I'll take a stab at an analogy, though it may have its weaknesses: If I give you a car, but I refuse to let you get in it or drive it, then (1) I didn't really give it to you, (2) it's not yours to use, and (3) the gift is worthless.
> It's also worth mentioning that if God creates to the perfect of his vision than I think that indicates He would also have to be omniscient.
I agree.
> Omniscience
Omniscience also has its logical limits. In the same absurd senses, God doesn’t know what it’s like to learn. He doesn’t know what it’s like to not know everything, and other such nonsense. These are false paradoxes. When we say that God is omniscient, we are undeniably talking about all things that are proper objects of knowledge. By omniscience we mean that God knows himself and all other things, whether they are past, present, or future, and he knows them exhaustively and to both extents of eternity. Such knowledge cannot come about through reasoning, process, empiricism, induction or deduction, and it certainly doesn't embrace the absurd, the impossible, or the self-contradictory.
To complicate the problem of defining omniscience, it can't be established what knowledge really is and how it all works. What are the principle grounds of knowledge, and particularly of God's knowledge? Does he evaluate propositions? Does he perceive? What about intuitions, reasoning, logic, and creativity? We consider knowledge to be the result of neurobiological events, but what is it for God?
The Bible defines God's mind as...
* creating new information (Isa. 40-48)
* showing comprehension
* gaining new information (Gn. 22.12, but it's not new knowledge)
* He orders the cosmos (Gn. 1)
* He designs (viz., the plan for the temple)
* He deliberates (Hos. 11.8)
* He can reason with people (the whole book of Malachi; Gn. 18.17-33)
* He can change a course of action (Ex. 32; 1 Sam. 8-12)
* He remembers (all over the place)
Is God's omniscience propositional or non-propositional? Can God have beliefs (since beliefs can be true, and beliefs are different than knowledge)? Are God's beliefs occurrent or dispositional? As you can see, this can all get pretty deep pretty quickly. At root, a cognitive faculty is simply a particular ability to know something, and since God knows everything, his cognitive faculties are both complete and operational. Perhaps we can define God's omniscience as:
* Having knowledge of all true propositions and having no false beliefs
* Having knowledge that is not surpassed or surpassable
> Being all-knowing dictates that he would have prior knowledge of events before they happen. That Satan in time would turn against him. This extends to man as well.
This is correct.
> Free will really has nothing to do with it.
Not with the discussion of God's omniscience, except that we know that knowledge is not causative. Only power is causative. That God knows something has NO implications regarding free will. God's knowledge doesn't interfere with genuine free will. That's where this statement of yours ("The ability to know the future removes all the supposed possibilities of what could happen.") becomes incorrect. Because God is able to move forward in time has no implications on the very real possibilities of real life. He can see it, but He didn't determine it.
Therefore your conclusion is misguided: "That means that Satan and mankind act and function exactly how God wanted." Supposing you and I are in an ice cream shop. I have the cool-o ability to move forward in time, so I do that and see what you're going to order. My knowledge didn't make you order it. My knowledge doesn't interfere with your free will decision in the least. My ability to see is not the same as my determining you to "act and function" in any way at all.
The Bible is quite clear that Satan and humankind do NOT act and function how God wanted. His ability to see all and know all is not determinative.