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[jimwalton]

> You don't "choose to believe".

There are some things we can't choose to believe or not, like a flat Earth or the existence of the sun. But there are many things we can choose to believe, like whether or not Britain should exit from the European union, or whether Donald Trump is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors.

> Could you choose to believe Christianity is not true?

Absolutely. If I became convinced through evidence that it were not true, I would desert it. Many people change religions in the course of their lives (granted, many don't; some weigh evidences, others believe blindly). But I could choose to believe Christianity is not true if the evidence led in that direction.

[Book Mitten]

> It's not that "if you argue against God you argue against good," but more that in the afterlife, common-grace goodness may not be available.

Why's that? Even if rejecting God in this life could be considered a crime, in this life it would be a crime with temporal weight. I'm aware you're saying that not everyone will be punished eternally, but several philosophers including Aquinas say that punishment in hell exceeds the greatest pains in this life. To me this is barbaric. I also think that rejection of God can simply be because a person is mistaken (that is if God exists, for the sake of argument). Thus punishment like how Aquinas pictures it is uncalled for.

[jimwalton]

> but several philosophers including Aquinas say that punishment in hell exceeds the greatest pains in this life. To me this is barbaric.

That's speculative on Aquinas's part. How disastrous and undesirable hell are adequately portrayed in Scriptures, but describing exactly what it will be like is difficult, if not impossible. C.S. Lewis, in "The Great Divorce," had a very different concept of hell than Aquinas.

> I also think that rejection of God can simply be because a person is mistaken (that is if God exists, for the sake of argument).

I agree. I put my trust in the theology that God will be perfectly fair with people.

[Book Mitten]

> When a secularist says we're just evolved chemicals, as I think we've discussed,

We've discussed it and we both disagree with that view, at least regarding emergent properties. I have never claimed "It's just chemicals" to explain consciousness, because chemicals are not conscious. We are. I don't think you need to be religious to think this way.

> There is a lot of "borrowing" of Christian "capital" in claiming that there is such a thing as good, that life has meaning, that people have value, etc.

People have value in other cultures, and life doesn't have to have meaning in order for that to be the case. Life can be the meaning itself, as a (to some extent) irreducible thing. You'll know this is my view as I've said it before, but that's my response to secular nihilism.

The same valuing of living things can be found in other cultures too. Just look at certain parts of Confucianism in the Analects.

> On another front, the whole idea of meaning in life, moral, values, integrity, kindness, etc., are Christian ideals rather than secular ones

I don't think this is true. I'll need a separate response to go into detail though. Let me ask you this: If you suddenly became unconvinced that God exists, would you still behave in a moral way?

> (while someone else may choose not to, and that position has just as much merit as yours).

No it doesn't. If they cause harm it is objectively bad, because of the objective existence of the bad. I'm pretty sure you'd agree with my values quicker than their's, even if yours stem from theism and mine don't.

[jimwalton]

> Let me ask you this: If you suddenly became unconvinced that God exists, would you still behave in a moral way?

The "what if" question is always impossible to answer. I assume I still would be, primary because I would still be borrowing values from the Christian worldview even though I decided against it. If the only values and morals are ones that I subjectively decide to guide my life, and there is no standard to determine whether that is right or wrong, someone else could decide completely differently and claim just as much legitimacy as anyone else. Without objectivity, we're all just individuals making our way, but wrong is no different from right because we each get to decide, and for each of us, our decision makes it legitimate.

I've known many people, however, who, when they leave Christianity, change their moral codes, for sure, and behave in ways that I consider to be immoral.

> If they cause harm it is objectively bad

Not everyone subscribes to the code of "moral is what contributes to human wellbeing," and there is nothing particular that would compel one to decide that. In a strictly Darwinian sense, "moral" can mean "what contributes to my survival," and in a hedonistic sense (and there have been true hedonists in the world), "what contributes to my happiness." And who's to say they're wrong if there is no objective moral standard? It's a turkey shoot.

[Book Mitten]

Another issue I would raise here is the multiple factors considered in God "bringing something good out of something bad" as we have discussed. One factor is intention. Some Christians point to scripture to say that a human intended something for evil, but God made it for good. Presumably then the perpetuation of evil being made good is superior to God coming down to stop the evil occuring in the first place.

The question then is whether the evil act can be considered evil if the outcome is better than if the act didn't occur. I would expect you'd answer with some of the following:

1.) Free will is left intact if God doesn't interfere,
2.) The intention of the evil doer is still evil, even if something good is made of it,
3.) The outcome chosen by God is simply the best of the metaphysical scenarios he could have moulded, considering how traits like perseverance and such like could come into being.

Apologies if these are not your answers. I'd be interested in your answer to my following objections either way.

Regarding point 1, I'd say that if your claim that the victim still has free will is true (you implied they did) then God's interference in the event of a crime does not detract from the subjects either.

To point 2, how much are intention and outcome related? And can punishment to someone with evil intent but whose actions only causes the best outcome (since God shapes it that way) be legitimate if it's retributive and not just preventative? Also, how much can mistaken views and clouded judgement be considered in the case of the evil doer? If it is in their nature to desire bad, as that is what they think is good, how shall this be dealt with? Isn't it possible that the only thing that could make them act otherwise is some endogenous part of their character that pushes them towards goodness (and as such is arguably not chosen by them)

Regarding point 3, do the metaphysical constraints exist as an emergent phenomenon along the shaping of a world, or are they eternal facts/ideas in the platonic sense?

[jimwalton]

> Some Christians point to scripture to say that a human intended something for evil, but God made it for good

Yeah, this comes from Genesis 50.20, and while it applies to some situations, there is no expectation or thought that it applies to all.

> Presumably then the perpetuation of evil being made good is superior to God coming down to stop the evil occuring in the first place.

As we've already discussed, God chooses not to stop it in the first place because His interference robs us of our humanity, robs us of science, and ultimately of the ability of cause-and-effect reasoning. But I think we have covered this ground already.

> Apologies if these are not your answers

These are pretty close to my answers. thanks.

> Point 1: then God's interference in the event of a crime does not detract from the subjects either.

There are many evils that God interferes in (that He stops from happening in the first place or intervenes in the middle). But if He were to do so at the rate that most people want (which is essentially all of them), that would result in catastrophic alteration of science and humanity.

> Point 2: how much are intention and outcome related?

They are only somewhat related, as I think we all know. What we intend and what results are often two different things.

> And can punishment to someone with evil intent but whose actions only causes the best outcome (since God shapes it that way) be legitimate if it's retributive and not just preventative?

Yes, such punishment can be legitimate because the perpetrator was not responsible for the outcome; the outcome was God's redemptive work. The perp can not lay claim to, "Hey, but it turned out good, right?" His intent and delivery were only evil.

> Also, how much can mistaken views and clouded judgement be considered in the case of the evil doer?

This is where it's good to have an omniscient and righteous judge. God can be trusted to do what is perfectly fair. He can take environment, motive, and intent into consideration.

> Point 3: do the metaphysical constraints exist as an emergent phenomenon along the shaping of a world, or are they eternal facts/ideas in the platonic sense?

I would lean more towards the latter than the former. God's revelation and action don't exist as natural, emergent phenomena, though He can work within the natural world. As a being outside of nature, His constraints exist as part of His nature and righteous working within the world.

To be truthful, though, Christian theology parts ways with platonic philosophy. There is no particular notion in Christianity that eternal facts or ideas exist in some ideal form in the presence of God, or even that such are part of our Christian worldview. These instead are interesting philosophical musings to try to grasp the nature of reality. As interesting as they are, such ideas don't make their way into Christian theology.

[Book Mitten]

> But I could choose to believe Christianity is not true if the evidence led in that direction.

Here's the important term: "If the evidence led in that direction". I would ask if you could choose to believe "like that" so to speak, as if one day you woke up and said "I'll just believe Christianity isn't true today", with virtually the exact same information that you possessed the previous night when you fell asleep a theist.

> Some people generate that definition or evaluation as a choice because they reject, for instance, what the Bible says—so they come up with their own definition and evaluation. In that case they did choose it, and they're thoughts are not arbitrary.

If their thoughts are not arbitrary, they must come from some experience, however illusory such an experience might be. Some people are capable of rationalising undesirable acts, for sure, (many do it unknowingly) but their impetus to do so often comes from some part of themselves that they don't freely will into existence. Many people can "rise above" malevolent desires, but to me it seems that they do so due to a counterbalancing factor such as a desire to do good, for example. The better part of the person becomes sovereign and disciplines a would be scoundrel.

> And I still stick with the theology I've been consistent in expressing all along: God will be perfectly fair with people.

That's fine. I know you have scriptural quotes to support all that, but my contention is that if people are not treated fairly in this world, I don't see why I should trust that it be any different in the next. For all I know, God might turn around and (from our perspective if not his) change the rules in a similar way to how he did with Abraham or perhaps Job.

[jimwalton]

> I would ask if you could choose to believe "like that" so to speak, as if one day you woke up and said "I'll just believe Christianity isn't true today", with virtually the exact same information that you possessed the previous night when you fell asleep a theist.

Of course not. That's self-contradictory. You're asking me if I can disbelieve what I believe, or count as false what I count as true. I examined the evidence to make the decision I did, and I would examine the evidence to change it. No one can just disbelieve what they believe. We've passed from reason into absurdity.

But I don't know what that has to do with anything. I make my choices based on evidence, not self-contradictory blind decisions.

> If their thoughts are not arbitrary, they must come from some experience, however illusory such an experience might be.

Not necessarily. I have found that many people make decisions (even about truth and falseness, right and wrong, and what they choose to believe) on visceral intuitions, not even on experience, let alone research. People can have exactly the same experiences and yet react totally differently.

> but their impetus to do so often comes from some part of themselves that they don't freely will into existence.

I don't think so. The impetus, I think, comes from predispositions combined with experiences combined with visceral intuitions. We are quite complex beings, and I don't agree that we can pin it down to one source. Nature and nurture; predispositions, personality, and experiences that weave together to create not only an identity but also a perspective.

> Many people can "rise above" malevolent desires, but to me it seems that they do so due to a counterbalancing factor such as a desire to do good, for example.

I agree that many do, but the reasons are more complex than a desire (and possibly you are not implying that desire is the only factor involved). Some people just seem to be born optimists. Some are, like, born complainers. And some, we have to wonder, seem to be born psychopaths. Not that "born" is the whole picture; it never is.

> my contention is that if people are not treated fairly in this world, I don't see why I should trust that it be any different in the next.

It's because this world is for a different purpose, and is therefore operating on different rules. A rugby player acts very different in the arena on the field than he does at home (well, hopefully, right?). The rules of each arena are different, and suited to not only the environment but also to the purpose.

Churchill knew that wartime required a different mode of governance than normal life. Instead of a chicken in every pot and a car in every garage, he promised blood, toil, tears and sweat.

The only way we know anything about the afterlife is in what is revealed to us. Since I have been convinced by evidence to trust the Bible, I then choose to believe what it tells me about the afterlife. According to the Bible, the "rules" will not and cannot be turned around.

[Book Mitten]

> Not everyone subscribes to the code of "moral is what contributes to human wellbeing,"

Not everyone is correct. Some people are stupid and wrong.

> and there is nothing particular that would compel one to decide that.

When push literally comes to shove, people who don't value the well-being of living things will at least in practice value their own well being. If I hit them in the face they would likely be indignant. This implies a value on wellbeing, and if the well-being of other living things didn't get in the way of their own wellbeing (assuming they didn't care this way or that about others) I don't see why they wouldn't say "Others having good lives, why not?"