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[Book Mitten]

Can I ask if you would agree that there is a difference between will and free will? There can be a case of intention that cannot change the nature of itself, expect by way of a stronger intention, can't that sometimes be the case? (Perhaps not always, but on occasion)

[jimwalton]

It sounds like a fascinating subject, so you'll have to explain. What kind of will can exist where it isn't free? How can one have intention but be determined/set/not free? I'm trying to think it through, but I'm hitting mental obstacles. If the thoughts that come to my mind are biologically determined, how can my subsequent action be called "will"? Isn't it just chemistry? An explanation would help for me to respond in a responsible way.

[Book Mitten]

> If the thoughts that come to my mind are biologically determined, how can my subsequent action be called "will"? Isn't it just chemistry?

I'm not saying they're biologically determined. I guess I'm saying they're "reality determined" and/or "experience determined." They cannot be otherwise than they are. They exist and so by the nature of them existing in the first place they have certain properties. Those properties might change at some point, but that wouldn't make the will "free", it would simply imply a kind of flux, as far as I can see.

> How can one have intention but be determined/set/not free?

I'm not saying intentions are set. They can change. There just needs to be some ontological factor that leaves open the possibility of change.

> What kind of will can exist where it isn't free?

I can't make myself want to harm what I value, for example.

[jimwalton]

> I guess I'm saying they're "reality determined" and/or "experience determined."

I do want to understand this. So in minds, you're saying, there is something that's not just biological determinism. Something in us is able to process our reality-based experiences, but those experiences and our reactions to them are biologically and chemically determined—they cannot be otherwise than they are. So, for instance, when you drive (if your town is anything like mine), you have several routes you could take to the same destination. What you are claiming is that as you drive, the other cars you see on the road, along with the weather and whatever, make it impossible for you to make a choice as to which route you will take. It cannot be otherwise than what it is. It's out of your hands?

Or when you go to a store to buy deodorant, and there are 20 different choices on the shelf, the reality there or whatever experiences are happening (colors, price, mood) guide you to select one that cannot be otherwise than what it is. You don't have a true free-will choice, but rather these experiences (criteria, properties) make a true free-will choice impossible for you. The nature of these criteria motivate a choice that cannot be otherwise.

If I'm right in understanding your position, that doesn't make sense to me. When I drive and when I choose deodorant off the shelf, my consciousness is directing my arms to steer and select in the direction I choose, and sometimes I even change my mind in mid-stream. I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul.

You'll need to explain this "flux" to me more clearly. If the "flux" allows for variation, or variable response, how does your identity or consciousness make a choice between the alternatives? And why isn't that free will?

> I'm not saying intentions are set. They can change. There just needs to be some ontological factor that leaves open the possibility of change.

How does this ontological factor differ from free will? What in you is legitimately selecting between alternatives?

> I can't make myself want to harm what I value, for example.

In my estimation, it's my conscience that creates that barrier. In many situations people plow through their consciences to do what they consider to be objectionable or harmful (stealing, lying, cheating, and in more severe cases rape, murder, child sexual abuse, human trafficking, etc.).

Are you aware of the classic Milgram experiment? (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment)

[Book Mitten]

> Are you aware of the classic Milgram experiment?

Yes. That would be an example of people being influenced by other factors such as authority figures giving orders or a lack of conscience.

> How does this ontological factor differ from free will? What in you is legitimately selecting between alternatives?

Depends on the situation, but my will and not free will is shaped by experience, memory, senses, weighing up of information and so on. This shapes my nature and thus inclination towards one option over another.

> how does your identity or consciousness make a choice between the alternatives? And why isn't that free will?

To use an analogy, a stone dropping into a lake is clearly the cause of the splash that follows, but the stone does not "freely will" it. It has a certain nature which influences other things and is influenced by other things. You might say that a stone is different in so far as it is not conscious, but to me consciousness is simply a factor that shapes outcomes rather than something that grants us free will. There is another analogy (not mine) of a marionette being more free than a human in some respects as it does not have to obey gravity in the same way. It is pulled upwards (displaying a certain kind of grace) and does not have to think about consciousness and other things that influence humans. Sartre's idea of us being "condemned to be free" is also relevant. We can't choose to not have influence and we can't choose to not be conscious. Sartre's idea that existence precedes essence is something that I personally don't know I agree with, (I would say they are parallel, neither precedes the other, but I am unsure.) But food for thought.

[jimwalton]

> That would be an example of people being influenced by other factors such as authority figures giving orders or a lack of conscience.

My reason for bringing it up is it shows that people, despite influence and conscience, make their own decisions. They exercise an action that may go against their conscience, their upbringing, authorities in their lives, and even wellbeing. People show self-direction and self-determination.

> my will and not free will is shaped by experience, memory, senses, weighing up of information and so on. This shapes my nature and thus inclination towards one option over another

This is the question of the hour, then. If you are truly weighing information, feeling an inclination towards one option over another, giving consideration to various experiences, memory, etc., at what point and by what force do you make a decision? And isn't that decision and possible consequent action what we call "free will"? Free will is the modulation of ongoing action, the distinguishing of potential courses, the ability to reason, the exercise of autonomy, and the consequent self-direction of thought and behavior. It seems to me to be what you are describing.

> but the stone does not "freely will" it. It has a certain nature which influences other things and is influenced by other things.

Correct. If the stone is not moved by a personal first cause, it is unarguably part of a larger cause-and-effect sequence.

> You might say that a stone is different in so far as it is not conscious,

Indeed I would. Science tells us that consciousness is truly the distinction that matters. Impersonal causes must have first causes. Only personal causes are capable of being first causes. Kinetic energy is energy is motion; potential energy is energy stored. The only way something begins in motion is if there is a first cause. What puts a system in motion? A personal free agent.

> to me consciousness is simply a factor that shapes outcomes rather than something that grants us free will.

How can consciousness actively shape outcomes unless it is self-directed?

> There is another analogy (not mine) of a marionette being more free than a human in some respects as it does not have to obey gravity in the same way. It is pulled upwards (displaying a certain kind of grace) and does not have to think about consciousness and other things that influence humans.

I find this analogy less than helpful, first because of a lack of consciousness, second because its "obedience to gravity" is a misdirection because the puppet is ONLY responding to the influence of the human working it, including gravity, force, direction, motion, and velocity.

> Sartre's idea of us being "condemned to be free" is also relevant. We can't choose to not have influence and we can't choose to not be conscious.

I agree. Our free will doesn't allow us enter absurd states (like transport to the rings of Saturn) or be self-contradictory (being simultaneously conscious and not conscious).

[Book Mitten]

> It seems to me to be what you are describing.

Maybe we just have different definitions, but you use free will as a reason for evil whereas I don't think that the aforementioned factors that you seem to believe constitute free will (or perhaps require it) are explanatory for evil as a phenomenon under God. If people are compelled by their experience towards one option over another, why then does God not introduce himself into their world in such a way that they simply are compelled differently, if free will by your definition is still intact under such circumstances?

[jimwalton]

> Maybe we just have different definitions

I gave my definition of free will to try to help us stay on a clear path: "the modulation of ongoing action, the distinguishing of potential courses, the ability to reason, the exercise of autonomy, and the consequent self-direction of thought and behavior."

> you use free will as a reason for evil

To be clear, I used free will as a reason for the existence of science, the ability to reason, morality, essential human attributes such as love and forgiveness, and a cause of evil.

> are explanatory for evil as a phenomenon under God

If we are genuinely self-directed, with the ability to honestly assess courses of action and freely take them, then we are morally culpable beings.

> If people are compelled by their experience towards one option over another

I don't think people are compelled by their experiences. I think experiences are but one ingredient in the recipe for the decisions we make.

> why then does God not introduce himself into their world in such a way that they simply are compelled differently, if free will by your definition is still intact under such circumstances?

God reveals Himself in the world as a manifestation of truth, not as a compulsion. Think of the impeachment process going on right now. Adam Schiff is bringing a series of witnesses to the stand as a witness to the truth that he hopes will motivate people to pronounce President Trump guilty. He hopes his case will be compelling in tenor, but it cannot actually force people to decide in a certain way. Everyone must assess the evidence they hear and make a free-will decision. These conclusions will be based on not only their experiences through life, but also their worldview, their standards of truth, their honest (or biased) assessment of the evidence at hand, their regard for the personalities involved, etc. We can only engage this process (and any process) if we have free will to weigh, assess, deliberate, hypothesize, and draw a conclusion.

In your understanding, how do people evaluate and weigh data, consider alternatives, and choose a direction?

[Book Mitten]

> People show self-direction and self-determination.

Sure, but for me this doesn't prove free will, only that certain decisions can vary. People have different personalities and preferences, vulnerabilities, and so on. You couldn't make yourself like something you hated, and neither could I. We might have different things that we dislike based on experience however.

[jimwalton]

What is it in you that is deciding, and how does that work?