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[Book Mitten]

> If this is the case, we exist in a state of an infinite series that never arrives at a point of action. Our inclinations come from our consciousness that comes from our inclinations that come from our consciousness that come from... Some power or force must be able to be the first cause of our decisions and actions, to break the series and do something.

I think we're coming from different angles. You seem to be taking a Thomistic or platonic approach, where there must be a first an eternal unmoved cause behind everything thing else. I would say that A.) Flux and motion are primary and thus don't require a first cause, and B.) that there are a multiplicity of causes that influence each other, a plurality of you will. I am the cause of moving a stick, but something about the nature of the stick causes me to move it. There's a feedback effect, like in Karl popper's three world ontology. Neither movement/cause/etc is the predicate of the other, they both bouncing off each other.

[jimwalton]

> I am the cause of moving a stick, but something about the nature of the stick causes me to move it.

This mystifies me. Can you explain?

I take the approach that nothing happens by itself. There is ultimately a cause (or a plurality or complexity of causes) for every effect. If the causal chain is infinite, the only causes of any state is a prior past state that ultimately has no cause either. If so, we can never give a rational explanation for cause-and-effect. Even though each instance of effect may have an explanation (and in some cases even a complete explanation), the whole infinite series cannot have an explanation because there is never a reference point and never an explanation lying outside the series. It's ultimately redundant, inexplicable, and therefore meaningless. In the end, neither science, philosophy, nor logic has sufficiency of explanation for such a series. In contrast, if there is a first cause, we can arrive at an explanation, a complete explanation, a sufficient explanation, and a meaningful explanation. A first cause is then to be preferred to an infinite series.

[Book Mitten]

> I take the approach that nothing happens by itself. There is ultimately a cause (or a plurality or complexity of causes) for every effect.

Would you include God's actions and inclinations in this?

> This mystifies me. Can you explain?

Put it this way. In order for me to consciously move a stick, there needs to be a stick to be conscious of, as well as a reality in which I am compelled to move it (I might do so out of curiosity, in which case curiosity has causal power, for example. This is partly what I mean by causes bouncing off each other; the plurality is perhaps irreducible).

[jimwalton]

> Would you include God's actions and inclinations in this?

I was referring to our context: nature and life on Earth. As per our discussions, I regard God as the First Cause of all things. But God is also part of the cause-and-effect series. Jeremiah 18.1-12 shows this quite clearly, as do hundreds of other texts. God is responsive to our decisions and actions.

> Put it this way. In order for me to consciously move a stick, there needs to be a stick to be conscious of

This is quite obvious, or I am certifiably delusional.

> as well as a reality in which I am compelled to move it (I might do so out of curiosity, in which case curiosity has causal power, for example. This is partly what I mean by causes bouncing off each other; the plurality is perhaps irreducible).

Interesting. I obviously don't see it this way. The presence of the stick exerts a suggestion to my brain, but there is neither compulsion nor causal power. The decision to ignore or indulge is all mine. But we've covered this ground.

By way of example, my question to you is what prodded you to explain, and yet you could have just as easily walked away from the computer as typed an answer. While there is curiosity, suggestion, and even compulsion, you are ultimately the deciding factor in how to proceed.

Thank you for explaining, as I asked.

[Book Mitten]

> By way of example, my question to you is what prodded you to explain, and yet you could have just as easily walked away from the computer as typed an answer.

Depends how you define "you" (i.e. "me"). In another possible world, a variation of "me" (someone similar but not identical) might be inclined to walk away from the conversation, but I am not.

There are a number of reasons why not. I am interested (being interested is part of me, it's a causal factor, though not the only one), I think these matters are important to discuss (I think ethical philosophy can have an effect on how I act) and I'm also not at a concluding point in our discussion (at least by my standards). These are some causes, that are all parts of what we call the self, more specifically here "myself". In that sense you might say I'm the ultimate "tipping point" as Malcolm Gladwell might say. (I'd say there are other factors in the state of affairs in question, such as the nature of the world; how I respond etc, but we'll leave that for now.)

That doesn't mean I have the free will to be different. At least I don't think. I don't think as some do that people are purely products of their environment. Individual character and human nature are influential as well. None of these three things really have free will in selecting what they are however. I can't freely will my identity to be different. It is what it is.

You might say that I can make decisions to change myself such as, say, educating myself, or working at a certain skill. My answer is that such things are merely another part of my identity; they are elements of the changing nature of myself. Remember that I'm thinking in quasi Bergsonian terms here. Movement or energy is a key component. We are not static beings.

[jimwalton]

Unless I am reading you wrong, your perspective on free will and choice seems Gestaltian. Am I perceiving wrongly?

[Book Mitten]

Unsure since I'm not well aquatinted with Gestaltian ideas.

I'll research them more. It might be the case that my views have developed in parallel towards similar conclusions, but as stated, I don't know the literature well enough.

[Book Mitten]

> I regard God as the First Cause of all things. But God is also part of the cause-and-effect series. Jeremiah 18.1-12 shows this quite clearly, as do hundreds of other texts. God is responsive to our decisions and actions.

Sure. I'm talking more about the first point of the first cause. What was he doing prior to creation? What aspects of him and actions and thoughts of his exist prior (either metaphysically, temporally or causally) to our universe?

[jimwalton]

That gets very tricky, because we're talking about timelessness. It is theorized by most scientists that before the Big Bang, time did not exist, which is something we can't even hypothetically comprehend. So phrases like "prior to creation" and "What was he doing" take on a twilight-zone haze. I read this article a year ago (https://www.sciencealert.com/mind-bending-study-suggests-time-did-actually-exist-before-the-big-bang). Buzchshzsch (raised hands, head exploding). Yet there are those who say that God existed in timelessness through eternity past, but how can one exist where there is no "just a moment ago"? It's beyond my pay grade. If time isn't passing or progressing, there is just existence and no "prior," "during," "since," or "after." Speculating: in a timeless environment, wouldn't the universe be eternally existent while being temporal in nature, since for someone in timelessness, all is in the present? Again, it makes my brain hurt. A paradox perhaps, but possibly also true? Intriguing, but ultimately not a place I can go. I'm just not that smart.

But if I'm even close to right, all aspects of Him, including actions and thoughts along with ontological attributes, existed (there I go with a past tense) prior to our universe.

[Book Mitten]

> That gets very tricky, because we're talking about timelessness. It is theorized by most scientists that before the Big Bang, time did not exist, which is something we can't even hypothetically comprehend. So phrases like "prior to creation" and "What was he doing" take on a twilight-zone haze.

Indeed. This becomes problematic when trying to discuss God, especially one that wants to reveal himself and be known, all the more so when the kalam or first cause arguments are used. Why is it problematic? Because it takes things towards unfalsifiable territory and vagueness. You might argue that something doesn't need to be falsifiable to be worth pursuing, as Feyerabend did. This may or may not have intellectual weight. Even so, it would still be reasonable, I think, for me to demand at least some clarity on what we're discussing, if (part of) the proof of God is in this very discussion of a timeless origin of the cosmos, even if we were to ditch the value of empirical testability and falsification. It's also a reasonable demand because it's a determining factor in our lives and conduct, both regarding judgement or a lack thereof in the afterlife, as well as our mindset and actions in this world.

> Yet there are those who say that God existed in timelessness through eternity past, but how can one exist where there is no "just a moment ago"? It's beyond my pay grade.

Some would argue for simultaneous causation, (one analogy is sitting and creating a "lap" from sitting). The issue I have with this is that it still uses an example that occurs within space and time, even if the two things still occur simultaneously. They require that metaphysical predicate of temporality in order for there to be an action, as well as the requirement of a decision to make it so, which is temporal and in flux itself.

> Speculating: in a timeless environment, wouldn't the universe be eternally existent while being temporal in nature, since for someone in timelessness, all is in the present? Again, it makes my brain hurt. A paradox perhaps, but possibly also true?

Depends if you're using the B theory of time, which is possibly more accomodating to this conception. I'm not a physicist, so like you I'm limited (like we all are), but B theory seems to me to not require a conscious creator of the universe, as it "begins" only the same way a yardstick "begins" at the first inch. So to put it differently, it's possible in a B-theory universe that the second year of the universe simply follows from the first, and is thus temporal, but "comes into existence" in a similar way to the yardstick analogy. So you have an eternal existence or fact of a temporal universe, perhaps.

> But if I'm even close to right, all aspects of Him, including actions and thoughts along with ontological attributes, existed (there I go with a past tense) prior to our universe.

Would this exclude his responses to our actions? Moreover, what thoughts, aspects of him etc exist which are not these kind of adaptions to a changing universe? All these aspects (along with evil) make me doubt, which leads us back to the original question. Jesus seems more likely a superhuman or alien being.