Board index ‹ The Trinity

[Book Mitten]

> So the dog is not freely deciding which direction to veer to avoid me?

We're talking about will here, not outcomes. If a dog was forced to veer in a direction against its will, (drugged, or something similar, hypothetically) it would be coerced. If it veered according to its desire, it would be un-coerced. Neither changes the result. The dog in your example decides to veer in a direction because of its will. I'm arguing it cannot change its will. The only thing that could make its will different would be a countering will that cancelled out the will to get the shoe (the countering will might be formed from training, experience, etc) and thus means that the dog's inclination would be different.

> Sometimes my thoughts are new, not arising from a previous thought. That's my experience

A difficulty with this is discerning where thoughts begin and end, and whether thoughts can arise in a vacuum. Moreover, how are new thoughts as you describe them freely willed? If they are unforseen, aren't they just random fluctuations?

[jimwalton]

> I'm arguing it cannot change its will.

It seems to me that if it can change its will, then it is free.

> A difficulty with this is discerning where thoughts begin and end, and whether thoughts can arise in a vacuum. Moreover, how are new thoughts as you describe them freely willed? If they are unforseen, aren't they just random fluctuations?

Yes, this is a difficulty, knowing where thoughts begin and end. It's obviously where you and I see things differently.

These new thoughts arise by intention. I can sit here and make myself generate new thoughts about something—any "something" of my choosing. I can mull alternatives and freely pick one, or I can jump start a new thought out of nothing.

[Book Mitten]

>> I'm arguing it cannot change its will.
> It seems to me that if it can change its will, then it is free.

Yes. I'm arguing that it cannot.

> These new thoughts arise by intention.

Some do. Others don't. Some thoughts are just random fluctuations. The thoughts that arise through intention are subject to will but not free will. The intention is not freely willed.

> I can sit here and make myself generate new thoughts about something—any "something" of my choosing.

There are certain things that you can't generate thoughts of, namely things that don't occur to you. This limitation in options narrows down the point of focus if there are certain options that don't occur to you. Again, the part of you that makes yourself generate new thoughts is itself a thought, a particular of will but not free will.

> I can mull alternatives and freely pick one, or I can jump start a new thought out of nothing.

I think that jump starting a new thought out of nothing would constitute randomness. There wouldn't really be will involved, otherwise it would not be entirely ex nihilo.